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02/05/2019

Restoration of protected lakes under climate change: what legal measures are needed to help biodiversity adapt to the changing climate? The case of Lake IJssel, Netherlands

By Jonathan Verschuuren (TLS)

Throughout the world, lakes are facing deterioration due to intensive economic use. Climate change is exacerbating this situation. The only way forward is through implementing massive ecosystem restoration and connectivity policies, adjusted water management, and policies aimed at assisted colonization of endangered species. Current international and EU law do not explicitly require such policies to be developed and implemented, at least not in a legally binding way. In order to discover the legal prerequisites that facilitate the adoption and implementation of climate change adaptation measures for lakes, it would be good to have a look at some of the current best practices. One interesting example of such best practices is Lake IJssel (IJsselmeer) in the Netherlands, a protected lake under the Ramsar Convention and the EU’s Natura 2000 framework. In this blogpost, I will have a closer look at the adaptation policies in place for this lake with the aim to discover the legal conditions that have to be met for the adaptation policy to be effective. This case study is part of a bigger paper on this topic that was presented at an international conference at the University of Tehran on 14 April 2019, available here.

The creation of Lake IJssel

Lake IJssel (IJsselmeer) only became an inland fresh water lake in 1932, when the former Southern Sea (Zuiderzee) was closed off from the North Sea through the construction of a dam, called the Closure Dam (Afsluitdijk).[1] Originally, this was a sea arm, part of the estuary of the IJssel and Vecht rivers consisting mainly of marshes and shallow salt and brackish tidal waters. The sea arm was closed off from the North Sea in order to end regular floods that were occurring in the area and to create new agricultural lands to improve food security. After the construction of the dam, parts of the new lake area were reclaimed and converted into land. This land was not only used for agriculture, but also for new cities in order to reduce population pressures in the nearby Amsterdam urban area. The remaining water area became a series of interconnected inland lakes, all of which are now protected areas under both the Ramsar Convention and the EU Wild Birds and Habitats Directives.[2] Lake IJssel also became the Netherlands’ most important fresh water reservoir for drinking water and agricultural irrigation. It is the biggest fresh water area in northwestern Europe.

Lake IJssel’s poor conservation status exacerbated by climate change

Many of the species and habitat types for which this lake has been designated under the EU Wild Birds and Habitats Directives are not in a favourable conservation status, as required by these important EU biodiversity instruments.[3] There are several reasons for this. First, and foremost, the transition from this area from a coastal marshland area into an artificial fresh water lake had severe consequences for the naturally occurring ecosystems. A new natural equilibrium has not been reached yet. The water of the lake has excessive quantities of sediments and is increasingly low on nutrients and marshes are disappearing. Over-fishing and increasing pressure by recreation, combined with active human manipulation of water levels to allow for intensive farming and urbanization have turned the lake basically into a big tub with muddy, empty water. The number of fish and other water organisms have declined tremendously, as has the number of birds. Climate change is exacerbating this already poor situation through:[4] increasing water temperatures (leading to reduced oxygen levels and increased harmful algae blooms), increasing intrusion of alien invasive species (such as the quagga mussel, which affects natural algae and native mussel populations, as well as power and water treatment infrastructure), increasing peaks both in low water levels caused by droughts and high water levels caused by increased precipitation and increased river water run-off, bigger impact of several chemicals, such as phosphates from agricultural run-off in case of high water situations, and chloride from upstream salt mines in France in case of low water levels in summer, bigger impacts from recreation due to longer recreation seasons, increased flood risks due to accelerated sea level rise, which will make it increasingly difficult to flow off river water into the (higher) North Sea.

Legal requirement to restore the degraded Lake IJssel

Lake IJssel was designated as a wetland of international importance under the Ramsar Convention in 2002 and as protected area under the EU Wild Birds and Habitats Directives’ Natura 2000 network in 2010. The EU Directives contain much stricter legal obligations than the Ramsar Convention and have much more legal force through the fact that EU legislation is directly binding under domestic law of the EU Member States and through an enforcement mechanism through the Court of Justice of the EU. As a consequence, the Ramsar Convention has lost much of its relevance for those areas that have also been designated under the EU’s Natura 2000 network (which is the case for all Ramsar sites in the Netherlands).[5]

For areas designated under the EU Wild Birds and Habitats Directives, conservation goals need to be set, aimed at the specific habitat types and species for which these areas have been designated. As most of the habitat types and species for which the Lake IJssel has been designated under the Natura 2000 network are not in a favourable conservation status, many conservation goals aim at increased populations or at increased acreage for certain habitat types. The latter can only be achieved through restoration, hence restoration is a legal requirement for Lake IJssel. In order to comply with this requirement, the management plans for the lake have adopted a wide range of restoration actions, some of which focus on the climate change related measures discussed in this paper (ecosystem restoration and connectivity, adjusted management, assisted colonization). These will be discussed below. It should be noted that the management plans for Lake IJssel do not just focus on nature conservation, but on all relevant environmental issues. A range of legal frameworks apply to the lake, partly stemming from the EU, such as on water quality and flood management, partly from domestic level, such as on polluted water soils and spatial planning. Furthermore, all of these plans are part of a broader development policy for the Lake IJssel area, called ‘Agenda Lake IJssel area 2050’, covering not just nature conservation, but also water safety, (drinking) water supply, water quality, fisheries, sustainable energy, infrastructure and transport, sand  extraction, landscape conservation, culture, recreation and tourism.[6]

Restoration plans for Lake IJssel

The first phase of the plans, which runs from 2017 until 2023, primarily aims at stopping the decline in quality and quantity of habitat types and species. To achieve that, the current plan has five main goals: improvement of marshes on the edges of the lake for breeding reed birds, creation of new sandy breeding areas for water birds that breed on sandy beaches, improvement of availability of food for birds, improvement and enlargement of certain habitat types, and more space and tranquility for birds.[7]

Most, if not all of these goals align with the climate change related adaptation measures that are generally considered important, such as restoration and connectivity, and adjusted management. It is remarkable, though, that climate change is not mentioned a lot in the various documents detailing the restoration requirements for Lake IJssel. I assume that this is because of the already poor conservation status that requires urgent action even without climate change.

The following table lists some of the restoration measures that contribute to climate change adaptation for the lake (despite the fact that they were not specifically proposed with that focus).[8]

Ecosystem restoration and connectivity
measure aim
  • Replacing artificial, fixed banks by more natural banks and borders
  • Creating sandy islands in the main water body of the lake
  • Constructing a fish migration river
  • Opening up old creeks and streams
  • Gradual transition from water to land
  • Increase breeding space for birds & help sediment settle down thus improving water quality for (shell)fish
  • Enable migratory fish to bypass artificial dams
  • Restore natural connection between land and water
Adjusted management
measure aim
  • Targeted reed management (keep young reed plants in some areas, and perennial reed in others)
  • Introducing permits for commercial fishing with conditions
  • Banning certain recreational activities (boasting, kite surfing) in some areas
  • Concluding voluntary agreements with recreational sector
  • Adjust water level management to more natural levels is preferred; however, this measure is postponed to later, to be aligned with water management plans under climate change
  • Enable expansion of various species of reed birds and reed mammals
  • Avoid water birds getting caught in nets and other fishing gear
  • Reduce disturbance of protected birds
  • Inform and educate the public so as to achieve less impact on breeding birds
  • Establish natural water levels, plan for climate change related variations of water levels

Assisted colonization is not specifically addressed in the management plans. Yet, to some extend, this measure is relevant, although not connected to climate change. In the 1980s the Eurasian otter became extinct in the Netherlands, mostly due to water pollution in the previous decades. The species, however, was reintroduced and now is back in a viable population in the Lake IJssel area. Furthermore, some of the restoration measures do aim to facilitate the natural relocation of species that were not present in the area before. The latter is particularly true for the white tailed eagle that has colonized the area and has been breeding here since 2006. The artificial fish migration river mentioned above helps salmon and other migratory fish to recolonize the lake and the rivers feeding the river. The assisted relocation of soil disturbing fish species from another part of the area to the lake is considered with the aim to improve the quality of the water soil.

Enabling factors for the restoration plans for Lake IJssel

In this section, I will deal with some important enabling factors that determine the success of the plans sketched above: the available financial budget, the role of the various authorities and other stakeholders involved, and the the role of the general public.

Financial budget: The measures discussed above, go at a cost. It is, therefore, important to adopt a multi annual budget. Otherwise, the risk exists that the plans are not executed, or that implementation stops mid-way. In the restoration plans for the Lake IJssel, implementation costs for each of the measures proposed has been included. The estimated budget consists of two elements: costs for construction or establishment of the restoration measures (once off costs), and costs for the first ten years of maintenance of the restoration measures. The total amount of once off implementation costs is between 630 and 1,060 million euro plus between 41 and 89 million euro for maintenance costs for the first ten years.[9]

The role of the various authorities and other stakeholders involved: The governance structure of Netherlands can be characterized as a decentralized unitary state. This means that central government involves the provinces, municipalities and water districts in the formulation and execution of its policies.[10] Hence, consensus building is considered to be of vital importance and the Netherlands has a long tradition of always looking for consensus among all those involved. This tradition dates back to early coastal defense and land reclamation activities around 1200, so even predating the establishment of the Dutch State: such activities were only possible with the collaboration of everyone, and, thus through balancing everyone’s interests. This has led to the enactment of laws that have a subtle, and somewhat complex, system of joint decision-making on such topics as water management, nature conservation, and spatial planning. As a consequence, many government bodies are involved in the implementation of the restoration plans for Lake IJssel, as follows. Central government is responsible for coastal and flood defenses that are of national importance (i.e., all coastal defense systems and flood defense systems of the main rivers), as well as for complying with EU-law requirements (vis-à-vis the European Commission). Provincial governments are responsible for nature conservation, and for coordinating water management and spatial planning. Water district boards are responsible for water management (in a broad sense, including water related nature conservation), and municipal governments are responsible for local spatial planning. As the Lake IJssel area is located within four provinces, has 32 municipalities and six water districts, and since five central government ministries are involved in the broader development plans of the area, intensive collaboration among all of these actors is in order. Such collaboration is coordinated by the Minister of Infrastructure and Water. Also involved in this process are non-governmental stakeholders, such as (agri-) businesses and environmental NGOs. Environmental NGOs actually play an important role, as several NGOs own property within the protected areas.

The role of the general public: Local residents, businesses and NGOs are also involved through the regular administrative procedures that need to be followed with all government decision-making (at all levels) and that require effective public participation and access to justice. Hence, there are public hearings and other forms of public participation, and all interested parties have the right to go to court. Thanks to the intensive collaborative decision-making processes aimed at reaching consensus (as sketched above), there, generally, is broad support for the plans once they are adopted. Nevertheless, every administrative decision that is taken to implement the restoration plans, can end up in court. Often, court cases focus on the question whether a certain decision is in compliance with EU law, for example with the EU Wild Birds and Habitats Directives.

Assessment of the Lake IJssel restoration plans

The restoration measures included in the first management plan for Lake IJssel are important first steps to bring the ecological quality of the lake back to an acceptable level. Species and habitat types that are in a favourable conservation status are much more resilient to climate change than species and habitat types that are in a poor condition. The measures aimed at increased connectivity, such as the creation of a fish migration river and of new islands in the lake for the sake of nature are spectacular and have fascinating results even within the first few years after these measures were taken. It is also clear, however, that much more is needed to make the area completely resilient to climate change. Especially those measures aimed at restricting harmful human activities still need to be taken. So far, only some preliminary measures aimed at regulating commercial fishing and recreation were adopted. More restrictions, especially for commercial fishing are considered necessary, which requires redistribution of existing fish permits and closing of certain parts of the lake for fishing. More drastic limitations on shipping and agriculture will follow from restoring natural water levels. Creating more connections with the sea, between the various parts of the lake area, and with the rivers feeding the lake, would also greatly enhance the resilience of the area, but is considered to be risky from a water safety perspective. The current approach of setting small steps towards a gradual more natural ecosystem seems effective for now, but we have to wait and see whether this approach will still work when tough decisions need to be taken that are costly and will have clear negative economic side effects.



[1] F. Palmboom, ‘Introduction. Lake IJssel – The IJsselmeer’ in: A.L. Nillesen et al. (eds.), Delta Interventions: Design and Engineering in Urban Water Landscapes (Delft University Publishers 2016) 52-53.

[2] Eemmeer, Gooimeer, IJsselmeer, Ketelmeer, Vossemeer, Markermeer, IJmeer, Veluwerandmeren and Zwarte Meer. Officially, these are all considered separate lakes, with the IJsselmeer being the largest. In this blogpost however, I treat them together under the overall name of Lake IJssel as they are largely (although not entirely) interconnected and all protected under the same legal regimes.

[3] See for example this document (in Dutch) that discusses the conservation status of a very long list of habitat types and species that require protection under EU law in part of the Lake IJssel area,

[4] R. Loeve et al., Klimaatverandering en waterkwaliteit (Future Water 2006), available online; Deltares, Mogelijke gevolgen van versnelde zeespiegelstijging voor het Deltaprogramma. Een verkenning (Deltares 2018), available online. See also the government website on climate change impacts for the Lake IJssel area.

[5] J. Verschuuren, ‘The Case of Transboundary Wetlands Under the Ramsar Convention: Keep the Lawyers Out!’ (2007/2008) 19(1) Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 49-127.

[6] See the special website on this policy.

[7] Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment, Natura 2000 Beheersplan IJsselmeergebied 2017-2023. Publiekssamenvatting (Rijkswaterstaat 2017) 7-8.

[8] Taken from a range of documents on the management of the Natura 2000 sites of Lake IJssel,all of which are available here, and here.

[9] A. Remmelzwaal et al., Preverkenning IJsselmeergebied (Ministry of Infrastructure and water 2017).

[10] See extensively, Wil Zonneveld, Governing a Complex Delta, in Han Meyer, Steffen Nijhuis, Inge Bobbink (eds.), Delta Urbanism: The Netherlands (Routledge 2017), chapter 5.


07/11/2018

Bilateral treaties and corporate impunity: the recent developments of the Chevron Ecuador case before the Permanent Court of Arbitration

By Jonathan Verschuuren (TLS)

cuyabeno

By Anna Berti Suman (TLS)

In December 2016, we published a blog post on the Chevron’s Ecuador ‘saga’, presenting the case as an example of the failure of the global environmental justice system. We presented five different scenarios of the battle for justice that since 1993 the Ecuadorean indigenous plaintiffs fight against the Chevron oil giant. Among these fronts, we here zoom in on the scenario that sees Chevron Corporation and its subsidiary Texaco Petroleum Co. against the Republic of Ecuador, the so-called ‘Chevron III’ case [1]. The case was initiated in 2009 by the company under the U.S.-Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) before the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague [2]. Chevron requested the arbitral panel to declare the State of Ecuador (through Petroecuador, the oil public firm part of the Ecuadorean consortium in which Texaco operated) as the exclusively liable entity for any judgment issued in the Ecuadorean litigation, Chevron vs. Aguinda. Specifically, the arbitral panel was asked to invalidate the $ 9.5 billion dollars judgement rendered against Chevron in Ecuador in 2011 that found the company guilty for its oil dumping in the Ecuador’s Amazon region where Texaco (later acquired by Chevron) operated between 1964 and 1992. The judgement, issued in 2011 by the Ecuadorean Supreme Court, was recently confirmed by the Ecuadorean Constitutional Court [3]. Chevron’s argument is based on two grounds: first, the company lamented the violation of the U.S.-Ecuador BIT inasmuch as the State of Ecuador did not grant a fair trial to the company in the Ecuadorean judgment. In addition, Chevron defended that it was released from any liability by the Republic of Ecuador by signing an agreement with the State in 1998 absolving the company of any future responsibility for its past operations in Ecuador.

On August 30, 2018, the Permanent Court of Arbitration released an award in favour of Chevron, finding that the Republic of Ecuador violated its obligations to protect U.S. companies under the U.S.-Ecuador BIT and international law. The arbitral panel said that the 2011 Ecuador Supreme Court’s ruling had been obtained through fraud, bribery and corruption, thus violating Chevron’s right to a fair trial in Ecuador. The tribunal consequently held that the company is not obliged to comply with the $9.5 billion judgment [4]. In occasion of the Arbitration Court’s decision, Pablo Fajardo, lawyer of the Union of Affected People by ChevronTexaco (UDAPT) representing the 30.000 victims of the Chevron’s oil contamination, and Justino Piaguaje, President of the Secoya Indigenous people, visited Tilburg University. In a seminar organized by Professor Jonathan Verschuuren and Anna Berti Suman at Tilburg Law School on October 26, the guests discussed the Chevron-Ecuador case in light of the recent judgement, reflecting on the applicability of the award against the Ecuadorian plaintiffs and on the broader questions that such an award raises. Letty Fajardo Vera and Suzanne Hagemann, spokespersons of the UDAPT respectively in the Netherlands and in Switzerland, and Charlie Holt, legal counsel for Greenpeace International in Amsterdam, joined the seminar as discussants.

pic1 with blog_Annapic2 with blog_seminar overviewpic4 with blog_seminar

Mr. Piaguaje introduced the participants to the reality of life ‘on the side’ of the oil contamination left by Chevron and what this means not only for human health but also for the preservation of the unique indigenous culture and lifestyle. Mr. Fajardo continued the discussion with a focus on the legal questionability of the award. From a strictly legal point of view, Fajardo stressed that the allegedly violated U.S.-Ecuador BIT was signed on August 27, 1993, and entered into force on May 11, 1997, which is five years after the termination of Texaco’s operations in Ecuador. However, the arbitral panel applied the BIT retroactively to facts occurred prior to its entry into force. Secondly, it is pretentious that an arbitral panel can affect the Ecuadorean Aguinda ruling, because it cannot have any jurisdiction over the Aguinda plaintiffs that did not even appear in the arbitral trial. In addition, the alleged release from responsibility granted to the company by the Ecuadorean government when the company terminated its operations in Ecuador only regards government’s claims and not private parties’ claims like those of the Aguinda plaintiffs, as also stated in the 2011 Ecuadorean judgment [5].

pic3 with blog_Charlie_Justino-Pablo

The recent development of the case inspired a discussion on a number of aspects. First, the stand of the Permanent Court of Arbitration vis-à-vis victims of environmental crimes has been questioned.  As Fajardo stressed, it is inadmissible for an arbitral panel to order a State to invalidate a judgment issued in a judicial process between private individuals and ratified by all national judicial instances. The award puts the commercial interests of companies before the human rights of the affected communities. The risk that bilateral treaties may act as a shield protecting transnationals from accountability for human rights violations emerged. In addition, the ruling clearly undermines the sovereignty of the Ecuadorean State and its judicial independence. By asking Ecuador to invalidate the 2011 judgment, the arbitral tribunal is compelling the State to violate its constitutional norm, to disrespect the independence of functions, and to jeopardize the human rights of the Ecuadorian citizens. Overall, the dangerous precedent that this arbitral decision may set was manifested. As a matter of fact, the case risks to become a precedent for releasing from responsibility companies that, with the complicity of states, commit environmental crimes against human beings. The award represents a failure or lack of environmental justice in a system that appears rather dominated by corporate impunity.

Photo credits: seminar photos by Letty Fajardo Vera & UDAPT (bottom photo showing Pablo Fajardo, Charlie Holt, and Justino Piaguaje); Cuyabeno rainforest photo by Jonathan Verschuuren

[1] PCA Case No.2009-23, Chevron Corp. and Texaco petroleum Co. vs. the Republic of Ecuador.

[2] See Chevron’s Notice of International Arbitration Against Government of Ecuador.

[3] Case No. 174-2012, verbal proceeding No. 174-2012, Maria Aguinda Salazar y otros v. Chevron Corporation, Quito, November 12, 2013.

[4] For more information on the case see A universal obligation of enforcing environmental justice? The Chevron-Texaco case as an example of the actual system’s failure.

[5] Ruling of Presiding Judge Nicolas Zambrano Lozada, Provincial Court of Sucumbíos, 14 February 2011, pp.34, 176.


05/03/2015

Unconventional natural gas in South Africa: regulating the nexus between energy security and water security – Aspects of a research proposal

By Hennie Coetzee

South Africa faces the challenge of meeting the needs of its (still) growing human population, and of doing it in a sustainable way, namely without affecting the ability of future generations to meet their needs. Energy plays a central role in this challenge, both because of its significance to economic development and because of the number interfaces and impacts it has on other critical sustainability issues – such as water security, among others.[1] In its quest for energy security, the South African government has identified unconventional gas (shale gas and coal bed methane) as a potential alternative energy resource.[2]

Coal bed methane is already being extracted in the Waterberg area of South Africa and the country is also looking to extract shale gas from the Karoo area.[3] The development of unconventional gas, however, poses a number of new challenges to existing regulatory regimes worldwide, including South Africa. These challenges are particularly pertinent to water resources.[4] The development of unconventional gas is (like most other fossil and some renewable energy sources) heavily dependent on water access and use.[5] This is mainly due to the extraction method of hydraulic fracturing whereby large amounts of water is mixed with chemical additives and pumped down a horizontal well under high pressure to enable the extraction of the trapped gas.[6] Studies indicate that the use of horizontal wells during a typical hydraulic fracturing process can require up to five times the water used by vertical wells.[7] The withdrawal of large amounts of groundwater can lead to the depletion of aquifers, and the hydraulic fracturing fluids known as flowback water, poses risks to water quality.[8] Issues of water security relating to water quality, quantity and availability are therefore at stake.[9] Because of the interdependence between the energy and water sector, an increase or decrease in one sector (energy or water) will immediately affect the other. South Africa is already struggling to maintain security of both water and energy supply and hence the energy-water nexus is very much related to its goal of achieving energy and water security.[10]

A report by the World Economic Forum highlights the interrelated risks between energy and water security as a security problem.[11] In addition other nexus frameworks include the notion of security as a normative goal complementing or even replacing the notion of sustainability.[12] The “nexus approach” is a new way to frame the interconnected challenges in water and energy governance, including within sustainable development policy goals. What is new about the nexus approach is that it considers multiple sectors as equally important.[13] Common features of existing energy-water nexus frameworks are interdependency between policy sectors, the need for integrated management across sectors and scales, and a focus on promoting security.[14]

While large amounts of water is needed for producing almost all varieties/types of energy – for example, cooling, storage, biofuels, hydropower – it is the process of hydraulic fracturing within unconventional gas development that poses the biggest risk to water quality in South Africa.[15] Concomitantly large amounts of energy are needed for pumping, storing, transporting and treating (for example, desalination) of wastewater – such as wastewater created from the hydraulic fracturing process during unconventional gas development.[16] An increase or decrease in one sector (energy or water) will immediately affect the other – if water is in short supply during droughts it may well lead to energy crises.[17] As per the World Energy Council:[18] “freshwater is required for each step – energy extraction and production, refining and processing, transportation and storage, and electric-power generation itself.” Without water and energy it will neither be possible to satisfy basic human needs nor achieve economic growth.[19] Notably, energy and water security risks depend upon the balance between economic, social and environmental consequences.[20] The cost of attaining energy and water security could be economic (eg) building new or replacing old energy and water infrastructure), social (eg closing energy and water allocations to restrict demand) or environmental (the pollution and deterioration of freshwater systems to reduce the risk of water shortage etc).[21]

While the drivers of energy and water security risk include socio-economic factors (such as population growth and economic activity) and natural phenomena (such as natural disaster, climate change impacts) it is the policies of each sector that are the biggest cause of risk.[22] This is the result of spill over effects – for example, the creation of incentives to meet energy security objectives results in the distortion of the demand for water.[23] Managing energy and water security risks necessitates the managing of trade-offs between separate or sector policy instruments.[24] Uncoordinated policy aimed at security in one area may result in less security in another: for example, less water security may be at the cost of greater energy security through unconventional gas development. Law as a social regulatory instrument is used to change human behaviour – and to achieve certain outcomes. Although a number of instruments within any regulatory framework could be used to meet energy and water security target(s) it is direct regulatory instruments such as laws or regulations stipulating, for example, quality standards, bans on certain products or practices, requirements for the application of best available techniques, obligations to obtain authorisations that are representing the bulk of instruments used.[25]

The nexus between energy and water related security objectives are not routinely addressed nor fully understood.[26] While the existence of the interdependence between energy and water is acknowledged in energy and water security terms[27] it is not certain whether the nexus (between energy and water security) is reflected in the South African regulatory framework generally, and specifically with regard to the development of unconventional gas. Regulatory frameworks that do not reflect the nexus between energy and water security, could, instead of ensuring energy and water security, achieve the opposite, namely energy and water insecurity.[28] This is applicable to regulatory regimes worldwide, including that of South Africa. Therefore it may be necessary to determine how other countries regulate and facilitate unconventional gas development and production within an energy and water security nexus.

A focus on the environmental impact(s) that pollution and depletion of water resources from the process of hydraulic fracturing within unconventional gas development may have on energy security (being an essential element of the energy/water security nexus) may provide a reference point for a comparative study on how other countries manage the energy and water security nexus in their respective regulatory frameworks.

[1] Bierbaum and Matson “Energy in the context of sustainability” 2013 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Science 142-1.

2] Gulati “Understanding the food energy water nexus: Through the energy and water lens” WWF-SA (South Africa 2004) 14 (henceforth Gulati).

[3] Esterhuyse, Kemp and Redelinghuys “Assessing the existing knowledge base and opinions of decision makers on the regulation and monitoring of unconventional gas mining in South Africa” International Water Resources Association (2013) (henceforth Esterhuyse).

[4] Reins “The shale gas extraction process and its impacts on water resources” 2011 20(3) Review of the European Community and International Environmental Law 300 (henceforth Reins).

[5] Vairavamoorthy et al “Water and Energy in the Urban Setting” in Jägerskog et al (eds) Energy and Water: The Vital Link for a Sustainable Future (Report Nr 33 SIWI Stockholm 2014) (henceforth Vairavamoorthy).

[6] Ross and Darby “Unconventional Gas: Coal Seam Gas, Shale Gas and Tight Gas” Research Paper for Parliament of Victoria (December 2013) (henceforth Ross and Darby).

[7] Polzin “Under Pressure – How our material consumption threatens the planet’s water resources” Global 2000 (Vienna 2011).

[8] Freyman “Ceres Report Hydraulic Fracturing & Water Stress: Water Demand by the Numbers” (February 2014).

[9] Freyman, Martin and Fisher The energy-water nexus: Energy demands on water resources (2012) http://www.groundwork.org.za/ClimateHealthRoundtables/water-energy-nexus.pdf [date of use 20 October 2014].

[10] World Energy Council 2013 World Energy Issues Monitor” 28 (henceforth World Energy Council 2013).

[11] Waughray (ed) Water Security: the water-food-energy-climate nexus (Washington 2011).

[12] Stein, Barron and Moss Governance of the nexus: from buzz words to a strategic action perspective” Nexus Network Think Piece Series Paper 3, (Economic & Social Research Council 2014) (henceforth Stein et al).

[13] Stein et al.

[14] Stein et al.

[15] Gulati; Vairavamoorthy.

[16] OECD Studies on Water “Water Security for Better Lives”, (2013 OECD Publishing DOI: 10.1787/9789264202405 115 (henceforth OECD 2013).

[17] Clausen et al “Energy and Water: The Vital Link for a Sustainable Future” (2014) 7 (henceforth Clausen); OECD 2013.

[18] World Energy Council 2010 “Water for Energy” (henceforth World Energy Council 2010).

[19] Clausen.

[20] OECD 2013.

[21] OECD 2013.

[22] Grafton et al “Global Insights into Water Resources, Climate Change and Governance” 2013 (3) Nature Climate Change 315-321.

[23] OECD 2013.

[24] OECD 2013.

[25] OECD 2013.

[26] OECD 2013.

[27] World Energy Council 2010.

[28] OECD 2013.

Category: Africa, Shale gas, water

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