By Michael Leach
Introduction
Scholars and policymakers have been considering emissions trading systems ever since at least the 1960s when Ronald Coase imagined pollution and emissions as factors of production that could be converted into transferable legal rights.[1] Although it took a number of decades yet before the first markets for emissions trading took off, there are now a relatively limited pool of functional examples of emissions trading systems (ETS) around the world that provide some grounds for comparison and lesson learning as these systems continue to evolve and future ones are imagined. There is tendency among scholars to treat the puzzle of emissions trading as a kind of multi-case engineering design process that searches for optimally efficient mechanisms, system architectures, forms of regulatory market oversight. From such a perspective, the few examples of ETSs around the world can be mined for evidence about what models and practices work best, and then plugging them into existing systems in processes of technical refinement. What is less discussed, however, are the boundaries of what can be learned from such inter-system comparisons, something that becomes evident once ETSs are appreciated more as regulatory systems in and of themselves rather than as a specific kind of markets that are subject to regulatory oversight. This blogpost will draw attention to these limits through a very focused and cursory comparison of the EU ETS and the Canadian emissions reduction scheme under the Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change along the narrow comparator of how the two are structured to produce prices on emissions.
ETS Comparisons
Comparative studies of ETSs are relatively few and far between, largely because the number of actual functioning ETS in the world is quite limited.[2] Of those that exist, ETS comparisons have largely been done to evaluate the effectiveness of different ETSs in creating a functioning market and achieving actual emissions reductions goals.[3] Other types of comparative studies have compared the experiences of different industrial sectors within single ETS systems to evaluate how well or poorly a given ETS incentivizes them to reduce their emissions and innovate cleaner technologies.[4] Still others have compared different specific features of ETS systems,[5] or have compared the relative effectiveness of ETS systems versus across-the-board carbon taxation to induce emissions reduction behavioural changes.[6] In almost all cases, the metric of comparison is the same, namely how effectively a given ETS achieves its respective goals.
By framing ETSs as forms of regulatory technology, however, much is missed about how contingent the designs of such systems are on the socio-political and legal environments in which they are created. By focusing on the technical pursuit of optimal models for ETS system designs, scholars sometimes forget to ask why it is that those few ETS systems that exist currently in the world differ from one another in the ways that they do. In 2013 Sanja Bogojevic argued that the EU ETS system was sui generis and unique because of the EU’s unique supranational legal environment. In so doing, Bogojevic challenged the notion that transferring ETS design and technologies from one jurisdiction to another is technical and straightforward.[7]
In the brief EU-Canada comparison offered below, the argument follows Bogojevic’s line of thought, not only to point out that the two achieve emissions prices differently, but also to argue that the reason for this difference is that both ETS frameworks are products of their respective idiosyncratic political contexts and constitutional legal regimes.
Comparing Europe and Canada
Both the EU ETS and the Pan Canadian Framework are based on a logic that markets can achieve prices for emissions in ways that will produce incentives for affected industries to reduce their emissions. Despite the similarity of their goals, the two systems achieve those prices in quite different ways, however. The reasons for these differences are not simply a matter of better or worse technical choice-making, but rather are intimately connected to the natures of the political and legal orders within which they are created. Indeed, any accounting for the differences between the Canadian and European ETS systems will always circle back to the constitutional natures of Canada and the EU as political unions, one being a national federation, the other a supranational federation.[8]
The EU ETS is structured to achieve prices by centrally determining and limiting permissible levels of emissions throughout the EU though establishing a cap on a restricted number of emissions allowances. Regulated industries are permitted to emit provided within the limits of the allowances that they own. By creating increasing scarcity of allowances as the cap is lowered annually, the ETS achieve prices on emissions as increasingly scarce allowances are traded among affected industries. Emission caps are determined centrally by the EU Commission and allocated by a combination of an open auction as well as some given freely to Member States to allocate as they feel is important. How many emissions allowances should be produced and auctioned or distributed is calculated according to both environmental considerations as well as the relative economic development of the different Member States, where some poorer countries are receive relatively more allocations to emit than richer ones). Over the course of its existence, the ETS has produced considerable fluctuations in emissions prices, but generally has been criticized for prices ending up too low, creating insufficient incentives on industries to reduce emissions accordingly.[9]
The Canadian system achieves emissions prices quite differently. The method for achieving emissions pricing proposed in the Pan Canadian Framework and promulgated with the 2016 Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act (GGPPA)[10] sets a basement benchmark price for all of its subnational provinces and territories to either match or surpass, using whatever means they choose, whether through a straight carbon taxes or by using market-based trading systems. In contrast to the EU ETS, the structural logic employed here is to rely on market forces (in those provinces that choose to establish a price through a trading system) to achieve an efficient sub-national emissions reductions within a framework that is centrally constrained by a basement emissions price setting. The Canadian federal system does not centrally determine emissions caps like the EU does because the point is not to intervene by controlling scarcity, but rather to set an outer framework for achieving at least a minimal price and then relying on the cost of emissions as the mechanism to structure how emissions are efficiently allocated throughout the economy. While sub-national provinces and territories that choose to set up their own ETSs are entitled to set their own cap and allowance allocation mechanisms to provide sufficient scarcity in order to achieve that price (or higher), unlike the EU Commission, it is not the Federal Government in Ottawa that does this.
Now, one can spend time wondering whether the European or Canadian ETS as they are structured will better achieve behavioural and emissions reduction goals. There is considerable debate in Europe, for instance, about whether or not to include a basement price equivalent (often referred to as an ‘auction reserve price’), while discussions in Canada have debated the value of a single national trading market instead of a sub-nationally variable one. To date, such a study has not been done, but its utility would be limited because the differences between the two systems are quite significant. The question of interest here, however, is not which system works better, but rather why it is that they are different to begin with. The choice of how a given political order will design its ETS to achieve prices is as much a political and structural question as it is a technical and economic one.
The fact that emissions prices in Canada and the EU are achieved through different forms of state intervention to manipulate prices, as well as the different roles and purposes that each system gives to the market to allocate resources and costs reminds us that both are fundamentally market-based regulatory systems, rather than merely emissions markets that are subjected to regulation. This framing nuance is important because whereas the latter suggests that achieving optimal prices should be possible through tinkering with forms of regulatory oversight to get the right fit, the former appreciates how the systems that produce prices are contextually sensitive and structurally determined by the political and legal frameworks in which they are created.[11]
Although Canada and the EU are both forms of federations, the manner by and purposes for which power and legal authority is distributed within each is critically important for understanding why the ETS systems that each designed look the ways they do. The most obvious difference between the two is that the EU ETS is a single system for the whole union, while the Pan Canadian Framework holds together a patchwork of different provincial approaches to pricing emissions, united by a common benchmark price floor. While the EU ETS was originally designed specifically to avoid the prospect of a balkanization of different national emissions trading markets within the union,[12] under the principle of subsidiarity that trading was more effectively done on a union-wide basis,[13] the legal and political logic of Canadian federalism precludes the possibility for the central federal government to construct a single carbon market for the entire country in the same way.
The Canadian form of federalism is based on a series of historical agreements that united British colonial provinces under a single federal government on the condition that provincial autonomy was protected from interference by the centre within certain designated areas of governance, including economic activity.[14] Section 92 of the Constitution Act of 1867 confers jurisdiction to provinces over much of the trade, industry, and resource extraction that are responsible for GHG emissions.[15] It is because of this that it would constitutionally difficult, if not impossible, for the Federal Government in Ottawa to play the same regulatory role that the EU Commission does when it determines emissions quota for Member States. Similarly, because the EU is historically a federal project to create a supranational, liberal, internal market among sovereign Member States, it would face a different constitutional legal challenge if the Commission were to impose a single price floor or benchmark (in EU ETS literature this is often referred to as an ‘auction reserve price’)[16] on the internal market in the way that the GGPPA does in Canada. While some scholars have argued that EU law would be permissive of such an action, they have also reported hesitancy on the part of economists in the Commission to consider it, concerned that if it were interpreted as a fiscal measure then passing it would be politically difficult, requiring a unanimous vote within the European Council.[17] In the absence of a centrally mandated basement price for emissions, however, the early phases of trading in the ETS is generally considered a failure for not producing high enough prices to sufficiently incentivize affected industries to reduce their emissions, helped in large part by giving too much discretion to Member States to freely allocate allowances through their National Allocation Plans (NAP) in ways that created competitive distortions and undesirably large windfall gains for some industries.[18]
Conclusion
The point here is not to argue that comparing ETS systems is not possible, nor that regulatory tinkering with ETS systems cannot be inspired by other examples around the world. Rather, the aim is only to emphasize the challenges that are involved in making comparisons between ETS systems. Indeed, in order for comparisons to be meaningful requires going well beyond technical considerations of economic and regulatory cause and effect. Just because a particular mechanism successfully structures a market in ways that do induce emissions reductions in one place does not necessarily mean that it will be feasible elsewhere.
Understanding the socio-legal embededness of ETS systems is important because if we assume that all of them (both those that currently exist and any future ones) differ in how they are politically, legally, and economically embedded, or, alternatively how the legal, political and economic contexts of each delimit the range of technical options available to their designers to a bounded set of technical options, then this poses certain difficulties when imagining the transplantation of ETS technologies from one place to another.
Furthermore, by viewing ETS systems as sui generis and embedded regulatory systems, rather than as differently regulated markets, one can also appreciate how difficult it will be to achieve any future integration of ETS markets globally, as some have called for.[19] Again, this is not to say that cross jurisdictional integration is impossible, and the case of the Western Climate Initiative that links the ETS markets of the state of California and Quebec proves its feasibility. At the same time, however, any such cross-border integration will require creating new sui generis ETS frameworks, as the EU did in 2003, but which will likely not be possible within Canada on a national scale.
This research is made possible through funding from the Netherlands Research Council NWO under grant number 406.18.RB.004.
[1] Ronald Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1
[2] At the time of writing, emissions trading systems exist in a variety of formats and at various states of functionality in: Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan (Tokyo), South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
[3] For example: Rita Sousa and Luís Aguiar-Conraria, ‘Energy and Carbon Prices: A Copmarison of Interactions in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme and the Western Climate Initiative’ (2015) 6 Carbon Management 129; Erik Haites and others, ‘Experience with Carbon Taxes and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Systems’ (2018) 29 Duke Enviornmental Law & Policy Forum 109
[4] For example: Sean Healy, Katja Schumacher and Wolfgang Eichhammer, ‘Analysis of Carbon Leakage under Phase III of the EU Emissions Trading System: Trading Patterns in the Cement and Aluminium Sectors’ (2018) 11 Energies 1231; Mohamed Amine Boutabba and Sandrine Lardic, ‘EU Emissions Trading Scheme, Competitiveness and Carbon Leakage: New Evidence from Cement and Steel Industries’ (2017) 255 Annals of Operations Research ; Georgia Makridou, Michalis Doumpos and Emilios Galariotis, ‘The Financial Performance of Firms Participating in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme’ (2019) 129 Energy Policy 250
[5] For example: Svante Mandell, ‘The Choice of Multiple or Single Auctions in Emissions Trading’ (2005) 5 Climate Policy 97
[6] For example: Fan-Ping Chiu and others, ‘The Energy Price Equivalence of Carbon Taxes and Emissions Trading – Theory and Evidence’ (2015) 160 Applied Energy 164
[7] Sanja Bogojevic, Emissions Trading Schemes: Markets, States and Law (Hart Publishing 2013)
[8] Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Neither an International Organization Nor a Nation State: The EU as a Supranational Federation’ in Erik Jones, Anand Menon and Stephen Weatherill (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the European Union (Oxford University Press 2012)
[9] For example: Christian Flachsland and others, ‘How to Avoid History Repeating Itself: The Case for an EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) Price Floor Revisited’ (2019) 20 Climate Policy 133
[10] Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act (S.C. 2018, c. 12, s. 186)
[11] Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation (Cambridge University Press 2012) 4-5
[12] Jonas Meckling, Carbon Coalitions: Business, Climate Politics, and the Rise of Emissions Trading (The MIT Press 2011) 115
[13] Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003
establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, Preamble para 30.
[14] Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, 2007 SCC 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3
[15] Most notably: ’property and civil rights’ under s. 92(13); non-renewable natural resources under s. 92(A); and for all residual matters of ‘a merely local or private Nature in the Province’ under s. 92(16).
[16] Fischer et al argue that an auction reserve price is not the same as a minimum price in the market. The difference is quite nuanced, however, and for the purposes of this comparison I treat them as functionally equivalent.Carolyn Fischer and others, ‘The Legal and Economic Case for an Auction Reserve Price in the EU Emissions Trading System’ (2020) 26 Columbia Journal of European Law 1, 10 Hintermayer argues, though, that an auction reserve price is not the only design option for a carbon price floor in the EU ETS, noting that other possibilities could include schemes for government buy-backs to prop prices up, or as a top-up tax to bridge differences between market price and a price floor. Martin Hintermayer, ‘A Carbon Price Floor in the Reformed EU ETS: Design Matters!’ (2020) 147 Energy Policy 111905
[17] According to Fischer et al. economies from the Directorate-General for Climate Action (DG CLIMA) are concerned that the price-based nature of an auction reserve price as a basement price would qualify under the terms of Art. 192(2) TFEU as a quasi-tax mechanism “primarily of a fiscal nature” which would require the difficult threshold of a unanimous vote in the European Council to pass. Fischer et al. have argued against this, however, saying that the main purpose of an auction reserve price mechanism would not be to raise revenues but to make the ETS more effective. Fischer and others, 4, 16-20 citing in particular Air Transport Association of America and Others v. Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, Case C-366/10. EU:C:2011:637.
[18] Oliver Sartor, Clement Palliere and Stephen Lecourt, ‘Benchmark-Based Allocations in EU ETS Phase 3: an Early Assessment’ (2014) 14 Climate Policy 507
[19] Adam Rose and others, ‘Policy Brief – Achieving Paris Climate Agreement Pledges: Alternative Designs for Linking Emissions Trading Systems’ (2018) 12 Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 170
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has estimated that the international community has until 2030 to cut human-caused carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in half to maintain a 50% chance of avoiding the worst effects of climate change. By 2050 CO2 emissions will need to reach ‘net zero’ – where emissions are in balance with removals – to meet this challenge. The urgency is clear: States, organizations and business will need to use every tool at their disposal to achieve these ambitious emission reduction goals. At the EU level climate action is at the heart of the European Green Deal – an package of measures. This includes importantly the European Climate Law that was this week adopted by the Council to enshrine the 2050 climate-neutrality objective into EU law and a 2030 Climate Target Plan to further reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030. Just like the Paris Agreement (Article 6 of the Paris Agreement explicitly recognizes the possibility for international cooperation through the transfer of emission reductions) and national policies, the EU Climate action framework is an transitional path towards climate net neutrality rather than a response to calls in climate science for a more radical transformation. This means that a lot of the current debate revolves around ‘negative emissions’ and ‘carbon offsets’ as a tools for speedy action to avert dangerous climate change.
Carbon offset credits are used to bring a net climate benefit from one entity to another, and the theory goes that as GHGs enter the global atmosphere, it does not matter where exactly they are reduced. These carbon offset projects could also produce so called co-benefits such as social and environmental benefits; improved air or water quality and biodiversity. An offset project needs to be adopted, implemented, monitored and verified to determine the quantity of emission reductions it has generated. Carbon offset credits can be produced by wide range of national and international projects that reduce GHG emissions or increase carbon sequestration. These carbon offset projects can include agriculture. For example, the agricultural sector can enhance the capability of its land to be used as a sink, so that CO2 from the atmosphere is naturally removed and stored in the soil or in above-ground biomass. While the contribution of agriculture to the GDP is relatively small (approximately 1.1% of the EU’s GDP), its direct contribution to EU GHG emissions is high, approximately 15% , but is also indirectly responsible for significant additional emissions. Agricultural emissions include those resulting from the growing of crops, the rearing of livestock and the management of soil to maximise production.
The agricultural sector has however long escaped environmental regulation, especially regarding agricultural emissions. Only as of 2021, agricultural GHG emissions have to be balanced under Regulation 2018/841/EU on Emissions from Land Use and Forestry (LULUCF Regulation). However, emissions from livestock are for example not included. Last week, The European Parliament and EU governments agreed on a reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). One of the biggest challenges is the alignment of the CAP with the Green Deal, the Farm to Fork strategy and Biodiversity strategy. The problem remains that the CAP is not a climate instrument and there is no GHG-MRV connected to CAP funded projects. This was also the outcome of a recent report of the Court of Auditors : during the 2014-2020 period, the Commission attributed over a quarter of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)’s budget to mitigate and adapt to climate change. It was found that the €100 billion of CAP funds attributed to climate action had little impact on agricultural emissions, which have not changed significantly since 2010. In the new reform for the period 2023-2027 sealed this week a compromise was reached that 25% of the direct payments should be dedicated to eco-schemes that shift farmers toward environmentally friendly methods. However, it is not clear how these eco-schemes are defined and they depend on implementation by member states. The compromise has therefore been received with fierce criticism from the EEB and other NGOs for having too many loopholes and potential for ‘greenwashing’ EU farm policy.
Meanwhile, the Farm to Fork Strategy establishes that a new EU Carbon Farming Initiative will be launched in 2021, in order to reward climate-friendly farming practices, via the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) or through other public or private initiatives linked to carbon markets. Carbon farming refers to the management of carbon pools, flows and GHG fluxes at farm level, with the purpose of mitigating climate change. This involves the management of both land and livestock, all pools of carbon in soils, materials and vegetation plus fluxes of CO2 and CH4, as well as N2O. It includes carbon removal from the atmosphere, avoided GHG emissions and emission reductions from ongoing agricultural practices. The Strategy establishes that the Commission will develop a regulatory framework for carbon credits but this is currently in its infancy and one of the questions is if and how market based approaches like carbon offsets or emission trading can and will be deployed.
Market-based approaches to climate change such as carbon offsets have also raised concerns and criticism. Several studies have identified serious credibility issues with some carbon offset credits due to lacking ‘environmental integrity’. For example, studies of the two largest offset programs – the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI), both administered by the United Nations under the Kyoto Protocol – established that the majority of their offset credits may not represent valid GHG reductions. It is not easy to measure and ascertain the quality of carbon offset credits. There are several conditions that must be met for the GHG reductions or removals to be real and effective: Carbon offset credits must be additional, meaning they would not have occurred in the absence of a market for offset credits. They should be accurate and overestimated (measurable), not be doubly accounted for and they should be permanent. Effects of CO2 emissions are very long- lasting, and once a GHG reduction or removal is reversed it obviously loses its offset function. Lastly, they should not be the cause for social inequality or other environmental harms.
To oversee that the quality is reached offset programs have been developed, usually by independent non-governmental organization. These programs develop standards that set criteria for the quality of carbon offset credits; third-party verifiers review if these standards are met, and there is a registry for transfer. Assessing the abovementioned quality criteria is however ambiguous and complex, and it is here where much of the debate is being played out, and where science and law meet. Article 6 of the Paris Agreement states that double counting will be avoided through ‘robust’ accounting methods. Nevertheless, the EU has phased out participation in CDM projects under the EU ETS, and Participants in the EU ETS could only use international credits from CDM and JI towards fulfilling part of their obligations under the EU ETS until 2020. The EU ETS, currently, does not include agricultural emissions nor has it used the potential to acquire allowances from offsets in agriculture, either via avoided emissions or increased sequestration. This is different in other carbon markets, such as those in California, Canada and Australia. Even though most of these offset programs have not yet generated huge volumes of offsets it is clear from the above that their relevance will become more prominent – as was also recently announced by the Biden Administration.
Looking forward to this, the EU already has already a rich experience with monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) under the EU ETS on which it can built for carbon offset projects. It can also learn from the successes and failures of existing protocols of agricultural offsets to identify design elements that can create or reduce barriers to effective mechanisms. For example, the EU can gain from Australian experiences with its extensive methodologies on a range of carbon farming methods since 2011. See our earlier blogpost here and here. California and the provinces of Alberta and Quebec in Canada also offer interesting case studies: all offer the agriculture sector opportunities to sell offset credits and protocols for this are adopted (e.g. for dairy digesters). The programs in these different jurisdictions vary in (economic) design, functioning and compliance – making them interesting to study and compare. Fascinating as well, California’s program is linked with Quebec’s program since 2014 (and briefly to Ontario’s program in 2018) meaning that offsets and allowances can be traded across jurisdictions. In two follow-up blogposts we will zoom in on the experiences with the offset carbon markets for agricultural emissions in California and Canada with a focus on the identified challenges above.
This research is made possible through funding from the Netherlands Research Council NWO under grant number 406.18.RB.004.
This is the first in a series of blogposts on a new project which we, at Tilburg Law School, have embarked on.[1] The projects starts from the recognition that the Paris Climate Agreement goals can only be achieved when greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture and land use are reduced and the sequestration capacity of these sectors is fully utilized. In most countries around the world, including in the EU, the heart of climate change mitigation policy consists of some form of carbon pricing mechanism. It seems inevitable that agricultural activities have to be included in carbon pricing mechanisms, such as the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). So far, however, policy makers have been reluctant to do so, partly because of the lack of political will, and partly because of the difficulty of measuring emissions and emission reductions at farm level. With the improvement of measuring technologies and carbon accounting methods, however, the possibility to also regulate agriculture under the EU emissions trading scheme has become within reach.
This project aims to develop a regulatory framework that allows agricultural greenhouse gas emissions to be included in the EU ETS and to be aligned with the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). This will be achieved through an ex post assessment of novel regulatory approaches in Alberta, California, China, and Australia and through an ex-ante assessment of inclusion of agricultural emissions under the EU ETS, either indirectly, through allowing on farm offsets, or directly, through requiring farmers to surrender allowances. Various models of inclusion of agriculture in the EU ETS will be developed and tested under a traditional ex-ante assessment methodology consisting of focus groups and stakeholder interviews.
The project runs from 2020 until 2023, so our proposals can be included in the first discussions for the post 2030 trading phase. An earlier adoption is not very likely, since inclusion of the agricultural sector in the EU ETS will have a big impact on the system. Changing the rules of the game in the middle of the current trading phase, which runs from 2020 until 2030, is not entirely impossible, but also not advisable due to the disruption of the carbon market it may cause. The European Commission, however, is stepping up its efforts to reduce agricultural GHG emissions through its European Green Deal Policy, which includes a proposal for a European Climate Law and a Farm to Fork Strategy.
The 2020 proposal for a European Climate Law introduces an ambitious overall target for the EU’s mitigation policy as it requires the Member States to have emissions and removals of greenhouse gases balanced at the level of the EU at the latest by 2050, and to pursue a new 2030 target of 50 to 55% emission reductions compared to 1990. Although the AFOLU sector is not specifically mentioned in the European Climate Law, it is impossible to achieve such targets without a drastic reduction of emissions from this sector. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the EU 2030 Climate Target Plan, presented in September 2020, does pay ample attention both to agriculture and to land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF). The 2030 Climate Target Plan states that new measures are being considered for the 2030-2050 period, including an expansion of the LULUCF Regulation to also cover non-CO2 emissions from agriculture. The European Commission does not mention the option to integrate agricultural emissions into the EU ETS. Instead,
‘(o)vertime, the Commission clearly sees merit in the creation of an Agriculture, Forestry and Land Use sector with its own specific policy framework covering all emissions and removals of these sectors and to become the first sector to deliver net zero greenhouse gas emissions. Subsequently, this sector would generate carbon removals to balance remaining emissions in other sectors induced by a robust carbon removal certification system.’ [2]
Similarly, in the 2020 Farm to Fork Strategy, the European Commission is hinting at a new EU carbon farming initiative:
‘An example of a new green business model is carbon sequestration by farmers and foresters. Farming practices that remove CO2 from the atmosphere contribute to the climate neutrality objective and should be rewarded, either via the common agricultural policy (CAP) or other public or private initiatives (carbon market). A new EU carbon farming initiative under the Climate Pact will promote this new business model, which provides farmers with a new source of income and helps other sectors to decarbonise the food chain. As announced in the Circular Economy Action Plan (CEAP), the Commission will develop a regulatory framework for certifying carbon removals based on robust and transparent carbon accounting to monitor and verify the authenticity of carbon removals.’[3]
So far, most attention is focused on using the CAP to promote carbon farming. In April 2021, the European Commission published a Technical Guidance Handbook on this. There are, however, a couple of disadvantages connected to the CAP, most of which are caused by the fact that the CAP has not been designed as a climate change instrument. I discussed this in an earlier blogpost. It is important, therefore, to also look into climate change instruments to see whether these can be used to promote carbon farming.
One of the “other public initiatives” for a carbon market mentioned in the Farm to Fork Strategy might very well be integration of agricultural emissions in the EU ETS. In the remainder of this blogpost, I will have a first brief look at what carbon farming as part of the EU ETS might look like.
Two models of integration: direct inclusion in the ETS or through offsets
In the EU, the ETS has gradually expanded to require GHG emitting activities to surrender allowances for the amount of GHGs emitted. Directly requiring farmers to surrender allowances for their emissions under an ETS has not been proposed much and is not a requirement in any of the emissions trading systems around the world. The direct inclusion of farming in an ETS is considered problematic because of the difficulty of measuring emissions and emission reductions at the farm level because of the variety of factors involved (such as the diet of individual animals, tillage intensity, soil composition, weather systems of individual regions, the way in which fertilizer is applied, etc.). In addition, most farms also remove CO2 through sequestration in soils and vegetation. For a small number of farming activities, however, direct inclusion in the ETS seems possible, especially for large scale livestock keeping within closed buildings, such as piggeries. Methane emissions can easily be monitored here, technologies to capture the methane and convert it into biogas exist, thus allowing farmers to choose between buying allowances or investing in such technologies. With the improvement of measuring technologies and carbon accounting methods, however, the possibility to also regulate more forms of agriculture with high GHG emissions may become within grasp.
Most countries that have an ETS, have included agricultural emissions as offsets. This is true for most newly created emissions trading schemes, for example Alberta (2012), California (2014), and China (2018) (Ontario had it, but there, the ETS was revoked in 2018). All of these schemes allow regulated industries to acquire allowances from offsets in agriculture, either avoided emissions or increased sequestration. The latter incentivizes farmers to farm carbon in addition to crops as was also suggested as a policy option for the EU by the Agricultural Markets Task Force. The Canadian province of Alberta, for example, allows farmers to register and implement such projects as conservation cropping, agriculture nitrous oxide emission reduction, changed beef feed, methane reducing dairy production and biogas production from manure. The offsets generated under these projects can then be sold by the farmers to Alberta’s industrial emitters that have not met their provincially mandated reduction obligation.
The country with the longest experience in financing farmers for their avoided emissions and increased sequestration is Australia with its Carbon Farming Initiative (2011). Although this formally is not part of an emissions trading system as here the government acquires the offsets rather than regulated industries, the legal rules governing the Australian system are very similar to those in an ETS and can be used as a source of inspiration for a modified EU ETS that includes agricultural emissions. A positive evaluation of the Australian scheme shows that the EU, indeed, can rely on the Australian experiences with its extensive methodologies on a range of carbon farming methods. See our earlier blogpost here and here. These include for example soil carbon sequestration, beef cattle herd management, and beef cattle feed methods. The evaluation does show, though, that the drafting of many rules and regulations is needed, such as rules that require farmers to establish a baseline level of soil carbon, and to monitor, report and verify the amount of CO2 sequestered in the projects allowed under the ETS offsets regime, as well as rules on commitment periods.
Relationship to other policy instruments
In the EU, as of 2021, agricultural GHG emissions will be regulated under Regulation 2018/841/EU on Emissions from Land Use and Forestry (LULUCF Regulation). It requires emissions and removals in land use and forestry sectors, including agricultural land use for arable crops and grassland, to be balanced. This will require some sequestration efforts due to losses occurring under conventional agricultural practices, but this can also be achieved in for instance the forestry sector. Furthermore, emissions from livestock are not included. Integration of agricultural emissions into the EU ETS, either directly or through offsets, will have to be aligned with the LULUCF Regulation.
Alignment with the EU’s Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) will also be necessary. The CAP currently encourages farmers to apply climate-friendly practices and techniques. Both the cross-compliance mechanism, the direct payments and the subsidies for rural development relate partly to taking climate measures. It has generally been accepted in literature, however, that current EU climate and agriculture policies are largely insufficient. A much stronger focus of the CAP on climate change is advocated, for instance in this recent study published by the European Commission.
Several individual countries have introduced or are considering the introduction of domestic carbon taxes or even a meat tax aimed at further reducing GHG emissions, beyond the requirements of current EU instruments. These domestic instruments should also be taken into account when designing a new pricing mechanism for agricultural emissions.
Impact on food security
Research by the World Bank shows that mitigation policies using a global carbon price which does not account for food production implications, will hurt crop and livestock production. To avoid such negative impacts, carbon pricing policies should be developed thoughtfully, and aim for adaptation and food production co-benefits. As discussed in an earlier blogpost, increased resilience and reduced emissions can sometimes go hand-in-hand. It is evident, however, that changes in consumption will be necessary as well. The difficulty of reducing emissions from free roaming cattle and the sheer amount of land needed to grow animal fodder for a world population of around 10 billion in 2050 necessitate dietary changes with households moving away from meat and towards plant based food and seasonal produce, reduced overconsumption of food and reduced food waste. In a great recent article in the new journal Nature Food, Rockström et al. argue that recent modelling analysis suggests ‘that it is biophysically possible to feed 10 billion people a healthy diet within planetary boundaries, and in ways that leave at least 50% of natural ecosystems intact’ as long as there is a global shifting towards healthy diets, increased productivity while transitioning to regenerative production practices, and reduced food waste and loss by 50%. Any regulatory approach towards reducing GHG emissions from agriculture has to contribute to this bigger aim to achieve a global food transition.
These are some of the legal and governance issues that need to be dealt with in the development of a regulatory framework to address greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture. For a full overview of all issues that need to be considered by law and policy makers, the FAO just published this comprehensive legislative study ‘Agriculture and climate change. Law and governance in support of climate smart agriculture and international climate change goals’. In our project, we will be focusing on the EU ETS as a vehicle for reducing agricultural GHG emissions. We will keep you updated here!
[1] This project has received funding from the Netherlands Research Council NWO under grant number 406.18.RB.004.
[2] European Commission, Communication ‘Stepping up Europe’s 2030 climate ambition. Investing in a climate-neutral future for the benefit of our people’, COM(2020) 562, p. 17.
[3] European Commission, Communication ‘Farm to Fork Strategy for a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system’, COM(2020) 381, p. 5.
Globalisation and global warming: When legal regimes diverge over contrasting goals
Nairita Roy Chaudhuri *
Since the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) treaty was established, global atmospheric CO2 increased by 16% from 359.99 ppm of CO2 to 417.83 ppm of CO2 from 1992 to 6th February 2021. If we are to restrict global heating and rise in mean temperature to a worst case-scenario of 2°C (according to the Paris Agreement) above pre-industrial levels, we have to restrict CO2 concentration to 450ppm. The CO2 concentration limit will reduce if we look at 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels as the target. Temperature conveys little about how global heating is actually experienced by human and non-human species in reality. Furthermore, a rise in global ‘mean’ surface temperature suggests that some places may have temperatures above or below the global average. Nevertheless, atmospheric carbon & global heating continues to increase despite the law. Those reading this piece at least might already know that we are continuing to destroy the support systems of life on this planet. With a business-as-usual approach, the world is already heading to a global mean temperature rise of 3°C this century.
The local & scattered nature of climatic impacts mean that disasters are not being experienced simultaneously by people across the globe, which makes the problem difficult to solve than this pandemic. We read and hear news about climate disasters assuming they will not impact us because of inadequate public awareness, utmost faith in technological prowess, psychological denial, or the nature of our livelihoods/jobs that disassociates us from a direct material relationship with non-human natural resources (a trend that comes with capitalist economic growth). Could be one, many or different reasons. I take ‘nature’ as a category that includes both humans and non-humans that constitute the web of life. Perhaps, human’s disconnection from non-human natural resources provides one with a temporary luxury of remaining in denial. Just last week, a massive Himalayan glacier burst open to flood northern India with more than 100 villagers missing. The year 2020 saw 15 most expensive climatic impacts including severe tropical cyclones, floods, locust swarms, bushfires and other disasters, two of which were in India.
The lack of simultaneity in experiencing climatic impacts, possibly render climate change as ‘forthcoming’ for some and ‘urgent’ for some, depending on the advantages & disadvantages available with people. Further, the slow-onset tendencies of many climatic impacts including but not limited to insect infestations, droughts, inland water salination/pollution due to sea-level rise make threats seem like an eventuality. But, none of these psychological short-sightedness really help us to flourish the support systems required for our future-generations to live safely on this planet, if we are to go beyond the Darwinistic assumption that the success of a species depends on its numbers. By no means do I subscribe to this logic in a society because, for me, success of humanity depends on many features of social progress such as nurturing an ethic of non-anthropocentric care (i.e. a care ethic that does not put human well-being at the centre but the well-being of life on this planet), social & wealth equality, justice for non-human species, gender justice, racial justice and many other significant developments. We are yet to achieve such progresses despite amassing economic prosperity.
On the one hand, international environmental law provides legal frameworks to tackle the problem of environmental deterioration and climate change. On the other hand, international economic law is allegedly protecting transnational capital at the cost of surging inequality and ecosystem destruction that accompanied globalisation. In addition, the lack of actual political will seems to steer away environmental priorities because of a structural problem in our economic thinking. One of the major breakthroughs in exposing global wealth (not income) inequality came through the publication of a French economist, Thomas Piketty’s book, Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Analysing historical wealth data from developed countries in Europe, United States of America, Canada and Japan, Piketty shows that just like in the 19th century, the 21st century is also witnessing a upward trend wherein the rate of return on capital (including profits, dividends, interest, rents, and other income from capital) is significantly exceeding the growth rate of the economy (nation’s annual income or output). If returns from capital exceed national income, it means it is accumulating in the hands of owners of capital. Logically, inherited wealth is growing faster than income gained from a lifetime’s labor by a huge margin, according to Piketty. This rise in inequality especially since the 1980s happened due to the political and ideological shifts regarding policies on taxation and finance, and most notably the failure of communism, as argued by Piketty in his other book titled, ‘Capital and Ideology’.
Inequality has massive and regressive implications on social justice, democracy, meritocracy, and very likely on the ecosystem too. Studies on high income and ASEAN countries show that wealth/income inequality is positively (not causally) linked with rise in CO2 emissions and environmental degradation. In Piketty’s words, “the history of inequality is shaped by the way economic, social, and political actors view what is just and what is not”. The role of economic law here comes in disenabling capital accumulation in a few hands. Because, if the unequal trend in capital’s and national income’s growth continues without any global intervention in the form of a global wealth tax (including assets and tax, as proposed by Piketty himself), the world will essentially see concentration of wealth and plutocracy in few hands, and a subsequent rise in populist-nationalism. What is unique about Piketty’s analysis is that it ruptures the artificial walls between the economic and the political, a wall that was created in the late 19th century wherein the discipline of ‘economics’ replaced ‘political economy’. However, his analysis, like most mainstream economic analyses falls short of considering a theoretical framework that captures the implications of wealth inequalities on the environment, and the nature of Global North-South politics that drives material extraction in the Southern states.
Political economist, Saskia Sassen argues, economic globalisation calls into question the extractive logic underpinning its frameworks that legitimise the claims of foreign investors’ and firms’ mobilization of transnational capital, acquisition of foreign lands, and expulsion of local communities & their habitats. Since the 1980s, structural adjustment projects implemented by global regulatory institutions, including the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO are allegedly weakening the democratic institutions of governments in the global South by forcing them to deregulate their economies, and pay billions of dollars as shares of their GDP, for interest on their debts rather than for local development.
Indian economist Utsa Patnaik, who studies India’s agrarian economy argues that the global market is structured in a way that promotes Southern countries’ dependence on cheap imports of heavily subsidised (given as direct cash transfers) dairy products and grains from economically richer Northern countries despite say, India’s environment being suitable for growing food grains. The economically richer Northern countries, on the other hand depend on the other countries for import of tropical and sub-tropical crops that do not grow in temperate zones. There has been growing pressure on economically poorer Southern countries to end the public stocking of their grains (a policy usually taken to ensure domestic food security for the poor) and reduce subsidies provided to farmers because they make agricultural commodities cheaper and competitive. Economically poorer post-colonial countries have been exposed to unfair global trade and volatile global market prices without proper access to social security benefits. This is incurring a lot of debt on farmers. These insecurities are magnified by climate change-induced unpredictable/erratic weather conditions. This trade model of ensuring food security for the poor living in developing countries through dependence on Northern countries is what she calls ‘recreation of colonial times’.
Also, global trade as we know, comes with unequal ecological exchange that allows richer states to – 1) import high impact commodities from low & middle income states and 2) outsource much of their ecologically impactful industries to poorer states. Ecological economists Jason Hickel and Giorgos Kallis show that the material footprint of the rich states have been increasing at a rate that is equal to or greater than Gross Domestic Product (GDP). What I understand through these ‘long’ global or local supply chains is a “spatial separation” between consumers and non-human natural resources, which is likely to shield human consumers from building any connection with or care for non-human nature.
There are ample debates arguing that capitalism structurally devalues ethics of care and ecological processes while siphoning off their benefits. The “structural negligence” within the monetised and capitalist economic system towards both ecological processes and care economy shows that a capitalist market-economy only values commodities that can be priced and whose value is worth exchanging in the market. None of these subsidised processes even features in GDP measurements. The devaluation of care ethic comes with gendered injustice too. With the pandemic, the burden of care and economic insecurity dramatically increased for women across the globe affecting both formal & informal economies. The crises exposed the valuable nature of essential services that run the economy silently in the background on shoulders of domestic care workers, labourers and healthcare workers.
For the women living in rural areas in India specifically, the crises increased their responsibility of ensuring household food security. In rural areas as we know, lack of access to public amenities like safe drinking water and sanitation increases women’s their care-burden in addition to executing domestic chores. Scarcity within households accompanied increased women’s exposure to domestic violence and care-negligence. Care negligence means neglecting women’s well-being i.e. healthcare, food and other requirements, due to prioritization of well-being of other household members.
Historian, Dipesh Chakrabarty argues that the ‘globe’ of globalisation brought global interconnectedness through European expansion and technological communication that was propelled by interests based upon power and profits. There is no doubt that it did bring prosperity for many but it also brought deprivation for millions along with planetary crisis. This is precisely because the ‘globe’ of globalisation never referred to the ‘globe’ within the meaning of global warming, the latter being a product of science and exploration of life on planet earth. Both the approaches invite separate legal regimes wherein one protects power & capital and the other protects the planet. Both these approaches lack a deep political understanding of conditions and everyday realities of humans whose livelihoods & securities are directly and (in many cases) regularly being impacted by changing weather patterns, reduced precipitation, cyclones, wildfires, droughts, floods and many more.
Let’s say, a farmer’s well-being is directly impacted by climatic irregularities in comparison with someone working in the services sector because the former group’s livelihoods directly depend upon non-human natural resources. For them, the relationship with non-human natures will be very different from that of those who do not interact with non-human natures for livelihood purposes. Also, the nature of such relationships varies among humans, because not all cultures look at non-human natures from solely monetary perspective. Psychological connections easily fall out of such monetary valuation of natures. All these considerations miss from climate science-induced climate law and globalisation. And even if they consider principles of equity and sustainability, they do so based on market-approaches that rely on mainstream economic theories. And, mainstream economic theories as I highlighted earlier herein, structurally devalue ecosystem & care functions, and assume that life on this planet and economic growth can be sustained simultaneously.
Population, sustainability and climate change
Today, as ‘population’ continues to grow to an expected 10 billion by 2050, this social construct continues to be problematized in relation to solutions to sustainability and climate change even by well-meaning environmentalists. The problem of production that is catered towards meeting the needs of unnecessary and ecologically harmful consumerism by the global elites is still being ignored. While we can morally blame the rich billionaires for amassing wealth and inducing economic inequality, we cannot ignore that capitalism is also culturally producing/attracting a material- and carbon-intensive lifestyle upon which the rising middle classes are nudged to depend through advertisements, relative possession & display of wealth & goods and many other social factors.
In a 2017 study, it was shown that 10% of the global elites are responsible for 36% of carbon emissions. This is an equivalent of 26.3 tonnes per capita emissions. The global elites comprised of populations from countries including USA, European Union, Japan, Australia, Canada and the elites from developing countries whose daily income is higher than $23 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). The proportion of carbon emissions comes from consumption of goods and services emitted through the process of production along global supply chains. On the contrary, 50% of the global poor with daily income of less than $2.97 PPP contribute to 15% of global carbon emissions. And the extreme poor who earn less than $1.9 PPP contribute to 4% of global carbon emissions amounting to 1.9 tonnes of carbon dioxide on average. The same study goes on to detail that the poor and lowest income segments across 90 poorest countries consume three items including food & beverages, clothing, and housing which account for about three quarters of their household income.
Most of the arguments problematizing population misleadingly camouflage unequal patterns of consumption & carbon emissions and unsustainable means of production, thereby invoking a sense of scarcity, insecurity and doom that is more harmful to the rural & urban poor than the ones who are better off. Given the backdrop of inequality, it is questionable to argue that the world has a problem of absolute scarcity, without looking into the problem of inadequate distribution of surplus. And, this is exactly what development economist Amartya Sen took up in his 1987 book, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation. He shows that famines are not necessarily a problem of availability of resources but a problem of access. Poverty is a human rights concern and the poor populations need entitlements to support stable jobs or income security that allow them to live on basic-necessities and freedoms towards a decent and secured life. Mainstream population debates also harm gender justice concerns because population control measures under most circumstances convert into women-centred policies that simply focus on women’s choice especially in the global South, without attempting to dismantle structural causes like patriarchy and nurture care between sexes.
Climate Politics: An example
Global isolationsism in the pretext of sovereignty is not a solution to address global climate injustice. Resistances from below can no longer be framed as national problems. Climatic impacts are crises that come with winners and losers. Unfortunately, climate already ‘changed’ and it is continuously ‘changing’. Some communities are already living with climate change. It is only a matter of time when the climate impacts such as rising sea-level, heatwaves and among others will directly cost the lives of the those living relatively comfortable lives. Elsewhere, I recently argued how rural & poor Indian farmers are already looking for political and legal tools to address the aggravated climatic impacts on their food and income insecurities because unpredictable droughts and floods are destroying their crops and bringing new economic losses. Recently, I also learnt how farmers in Taiwan are facing the worst drought in over half a century due to climate change.
Take for instance, the massive farmers’ protests happening in India today against the Indian Government’s move in passing farm laws without any public deliberation towards agricultural modernisation. At the domestic level, peasant movements are asking for seed & food sovereignty and alternative ways of achieving a good life that serves both material (social security, food security) and non-material (psychological connection with flora, fauna, land) needs in balance. These values are incompatible with global materialist & laissez-faire capitalist order. At the global level, Gita Gopinath, Chief Economist of the IMF has supported the farm laws in favour of deregulating the agricultural sector. Even Nobel laureate and economist Abhijit Banerjee commented on the farm laws in a way that supports the farm laws while adding that pandemic is not the right time to pass the farm laws. Deregulation comes with legalising contract farming (with agribusiness firms) and making public stocking of agricultural commodities illegal. The farmers fear that this model will make the domestic firms powerful and the sole controllers of price of agricultural commodities. Utsa Patnaik adds that it will make Indian farmers additionally vulnerable to the whims of global agribusiness firms. I must add that she is one of the few renowned economists who is critical of the profit-oriented capitalist model of agricultural development and contract farming. It seems to me that the farmers’ protests indeed has become a site of clash in political & economic ideologies between eco-socialist aspirations, and faith that runs the global order i.e. trust in capitalism and neoliberal (i.e. reduced role of the state) market efficiency for allocation of agricultural commodities. In the context of this messy transnational politics entwined with climate and agrarian crises, solutions are increasingly coming from experts who are still not connecting with protesting farmers.
While it is, tough to take a position on this mess yet, it is nevertheless important to consider that agricultural policies are made for farmers who live in a real world, and are finally responsible for the food that is on our plate. It just does not seem just and practical to oversee food security policies while ignoring farmers’ collective voice, while climatic impacts are already being felt on the agricultural grounds. If say, our bodies breakdown, we usually go to the doctor for advice instead of healing ourselves. We do this because we acknowledge that we are not experts in healing and hence trust some doctors. Similarly, if the agrarian crisis is impacting farmers, we need to question our paternalistic assumptions that farmers are not experts and certain economists/lawyers/political scientists are. Arguing that farmers are committing suicide or protesting (at the cost of their life) because they are unable to cope with crises does not say anything about circumstances that hinder them to cope. Often, they are not deemed as experts because their interests or ideologies hurt those in possession of specialised knowledge, interest or both. Lastly, it is also important to evaluate whether contract farming in its current form within a capitalist model is ecologically sustainable because often profit-oriented agricultural growth models come at the cost of soil and environmental health (nitrogen emissions from artificial fertilizers, pesticides and intensification), which may not be a wise choice given the climate scenario. Otherwise, we may land up emulating agricultural models that are failing (in terms of sustainability) in the Northern advanced capitalist countries albeit with a rise in material standard of living. I see this as an opportune moment to undo the mistakes that have been done in the past. Perhaps, it is important to engage in everyday realities of a society in order to uncover solutions that cut across climate law, climate science, economics, gender studies and political ecology.
Climate Justice
Addressing climate change is in fact a test of humanity of those humans who caused and are causing climatic crises. Climate justice helps us to break through the contradictory regulatory regimes of Environmental Law and Law & Economics, by politicising the apolitical phenomenon of ‘climate change’ beyond the contours of the nation-state and the politico-economic systems operating therein. It transpires the deep inequalities and dominations that nurture globalisation and global warming. It allows us to question who owes what to whom and why, and how these obligations should be distributed. It also helps us to question power dynamics that structure unequal control over resources that have climatic impacts at a local or planetary scale. Climate justice is thus, not only important to minimize the impacts of climate change but also rectify the structural causes of GHG emissions that are often embedded in neoliberal global development paradigms. Given the intimate relationship between GHG emissions, consumption and business-as-usual economic growth-model, we need a deeper democratic engagement that aims to redistribute power while holding the climate polluters & states ethically responsible if not legally. This can come through empowering grounded communities who can hold climate polluters into account. Macro-economically speaking, the state of affairs today highlight the urgency of human withdrawal from business-as-usual. The pandemic has already demonstrated the impact of our withdrawal, in that CO2emissions from fossil fuel and other industries dropped by 7% in 2020 due to lockdowns and reduced mobility.
Transformation as the way forward
Historians/Sociologists Dipesh Chakrabarty, and Ramachandra Guha & Madhav Gadgil (in their book, This Fissured Land: An Ecological History of India) argue that whether we blame climate change on those who are “retrospectively guilty in the West or those who are prospectively guilty in the South” (although not on a per capita basis) is a question that is undoubtedly tied to the histories of industrial mode of development (including industrial socialism & industrial capitalism), economic growth, neo-colonial continuities, modernization. To these categories, I shall also add patriarchy. I name these categories by borrowing a quote from Jerry Mander’s book, The Capitalism Papers– “If you are going to remember a thing, you must first name it…Naming something diminishes its amorphousness and stimulates focus – what it is, and what it is not.”
At the global level, regulatory bodies need to transform their governance mechanisms by decentering industrial mode of economic growth and dismantling neo-colonial continuities, patriarchy and other forms of domination that reify capture of power & capital by elite groups, in their policy and legal instruments. An enabling external environment is important for nation-states to decenter these majoritarian values from their respective national laws. Simultaneously, policy and political goals need to center an ethic of care for humans and non-humans through redistribution of power and capital.
Care needs to be centered in order to nurture collective well-being of life- including humans’ and non-humans’. However, the ethic of care needs to pay attention to politics in order to dismantle identity-based hierarchies and privileges that structure oppressive realities. Power decides much of the politics. Hence, power needs to be redistributed radically and meaningfully in order to empower those living in the margins (whether due to patriarchy, racism or other forms of domination). Further, capital needs to be redistributed equitably through wealth tax reforms so as to avoid unnecessary resource extraction which has further consequences on climate change and habitat loss of marginalised humans and non-humans.
Solutions to climate change need a transformation in adaptation and mitigation approaches keeping in mind that they address the ‘everyday’ realities especially of people who are living on the edges of the crises. People struggle or live every day; and everyday lives constitute realities on the ground. Hence, I emphasise on ‘everyday’ as the focal point of solutions. Transformations also undo structural causes of multiple crises (inequality, poverty, patriarchy, infinite economic growth, neo-colonial continuities) that make up for climate crises. We need to look away from solutions that speak to power, capital, and domination and look for solutions from the ground that center people who are directly being impacted by the crisis rather than speaking on behalf of them. What matters is the voice of those affected populations because they cannot afford to think and offer solutions on majoritarian assumptions of power. Majoritarian propositions are marginalizing them. Legal reforms could perhaps bear in mind the required decentering and centering of values as discussed in this essay, and capture changes that climate-affected people ask for. Law making, legal monitoring and implementation must be democratised.
* The author is a PhD researcher who can be contacted at N.roychaudhuri@tilburguniversity.edu
By Maria Alejandra Serra Barney, Nathalia Cortez Gomez, Lorena Perez Roa and Melanie Auvray (Alumni Tilburg Law School)
A few months ago, a team of four master students from Tilburg University participated in the Geneva Challenge 2018 on Climate Change. Our proposal aimed to tackle greenhouse gas emissions of the livestock industry, by creating a Global Tax Meat Scheme, that would allow countries from all over the world to have a profound transition to a cleaner industry while achieving a change on consumer’s behavior.
Climate Change is one of the biggest challenges of our generation. Action and cooperation from every country is needed, as well as from every sector and industry. While several actions to mitigate Climate Change have been developed in the most acknowledged pollutant industries, such as transportation, mining, or product manufacturing, the severe environmental impacts of the livestock industry have managed to remain in the shadows. Livestock industry alone is responsible for 14.5% of the annual worldwide Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions of Carbon Dioxide (CO2), Methane (CH4) and Nitrogen Dioxide (N2O), exceeding the emissions produced by the entire global transportation sector[1]. Nevertheless, a survey developed by Chatham House along with the Glasgow University in 2014[2], revealed that livestock sector is not recognized by people as a contributor to climate change[3]. As a matter of fact, one-quarter of people considered that ‘meat and dairy production contributes either little or nothing to climate change’[4].
Accordingly, and contrary to popular belief, the livestock industry is responsible for a large amount of the global Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions, which are generated through animal physiology (enteric fermentation, respiration and excretions), animal housing, feed crops, manure handling, processing of livestock products and bi-products, transportation and land use for livestock production (deforestation, desertification)[5]. This should not come as a surprise, considering its strong place in the economies of both developed and developing countries, as the main supplier of global calories, proteins, and essential micronutrients[6]. Likewise, livestock production is a good alternative in some developing countries that have difficulty growing crops and need to ensure the nutrition of their population[7], however relying almost exclusively in livestock products entails risks for human health and food security itself. The consumption of meat in developed countries is five times higher than in the developing countries[8], which increases the risk of colorectal cancer, pancreatic cancer and prostate cancer[9]. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), red meat (beef, veal, pork, lamb, mutton, horse and goat) has been classified as Group 2A: “probably carcinogenic to humans”; and processed meat (‘hot dogs’, ham, sausages, corned beef, beef jerky, canned meat and meat-based preparations and sauces) as Group 1: “carcinogenic to humans”[10], just as tobacco smoking and asbestos. This is why the WHO stresses the importance of the reduction on consumption of processed meat[11], which makes the leading role that meat products have in food security nowadays questionable.
In addition, the increase in the global temperature will have a direct impact on the health and life of livestock animals[12]. According to experts, the rise in the temperature will enable the acceleration in the growth of pathogens and parasites[13], which might generate shifts in disease spreading, outbreaks of severe diseases or even introduce new ones[14], increasing the risk of morbidity and death of livestock. Therefore, relying on livestock products to guarantee the food security in the world might lead to a food crisis in the future.
For environmental, health and food security reasons, livestock production should be limited and regulated. However, when it comes to international environmental treaties and agreements, even though there is a commitment and a mandate for countries to reduce GHG emissions, livestock industry is not really targeted, even though the projections indicate that animal product consumption will continue to increase[15]. Indeed, UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol only formulate a fragmented set of rules’[16] and the Paris Agreement gives general recommendations that prioritize food security rather than targeting livestock industry. Regarding the health and food security issues related to the livestock industry, some countries are already using taxation to encourage healthy eating habits on its population, for instance by raising the prices of sugary soft drinks or sweets. Nevertheless, this approach has never been used on livestock products that, as it was explained before, are known to cause several health issues when consumed in excess.
In this sense, a study on the results on taxing beef, pork and chicken[17] in Denmark, succeeded to prove that a possible tax on meat would reduce GHG emissions between 10.4% and 19.4% for an average household[18]. However, we believe that these figures are not enough. Our proposal for the Geneva Challenge 2018 consisted in the establishment of a Global Meat Tax Scheme, which would consider the application of taxes in developed countries and levied on the consumers in order to directly induce changes in meat consumption. It should be collected by national authorities which must ensure that tax revenues are given back to specific actors so they can invest in the development of eco-efficient technologies to support technological improvements of the livestock industry management, or to invest in high protein food alternatives[19]. Likewise, governments shall cooperate with international organizations in order to promote and support the transition into cleaner technology and farming processes in developing countries .
To make sure that tax revenue funds are safe and utilized solely for the intended purposes, we suggest the utilization of blockchain technology, which would enhance the security of the scheme, guaranteeing the transparency of all transactions being made, and as a consequence promoting trust among governmental entities and individuals. Likewise, States would be under the monitoring and supervision of an international authority, which would assess the compliance of the States and the adequate utilization of the funds.
We invite you to read our full project report for further explanations on this “Global Meat Tax Scheme” and its complementary adaptation and mitigation measures which would allow countries from all over the world to have a profound transition of the industry to cleaner livestock management while achieving a change on consumer’s behavior.
[1] M. Rojas-Downing et al, Climate Change and livestock: Impacts, adaptation and mitigation. (Climate Risk Management, 2017) 152
[2] Rob Bailey, Antony Froggatt and Laura Wellesley, Livestock – Climate Change’s Forgotten Sector Global Public Opinion on Meat and Dairy Consumption (2014) <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20141203LivestockClimateChangeForgottenSectorBaileyFroggattWellesleyFinal.pdf > accessed 16 April 2018
[3] Rob Bailey, Antony Froggatt and Laura Wellesley, Livestock – Climate Change’s Forgotten Sector Global Public Opinion on Meat and Dairy Consumption (2014) <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20141203LivestockClimateChangeForgottenSectorBaileyFroggattWellesleyFinal.pdf > accessed 16 April 2018
[4] Rob Bailey, Antony Froggatt and Laura Wellesley, Livestock – Climate Change’s Forgotten Sector Global Public Opinion on Meat and Dairy Consumption (2014) <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20141203LivestockClimateChangeForgottenSectorBaileyFroggattWellesleyFinal.pdf > accessed 16 April 2018
[5] M. Rojas-Downing et al, Climate Change and livestock: Impacts, adaptation and mitigation. (Climate Risk Management, 2017) 151.
[6] Philip Thornton, Mario Herrero and Polly Ericksen, Livestock and climate change (2011) Livestock Exchange Issue Brief 3
[7] Ibid
[8] Ibid
[9] World Health Organization, Q&A on the carcinogenicity of the consumption of red meat and processed meat (2015) <http://www.who.int/features/qa/cancer-red-meat/en/> accessed 22 April 2018
[10] Ibid
[11] Ibid. Cf: “The IARC Working Group considered more than 800 different studies on cancer in humans (some studies provided data on both types of meat; in total more than 700 epidemiological studies provided data on red meat and more than 400 epidemiological studies provided data on processed meat)”
[12] Alessandro, Nardone et al., Effect of climate changes on animal production and sustainability of livestock system (2010) LIVEST SCI. 57, 69 <10.1016/j.livsci.2010.02.011> Accessed 15 April 2018.
[13] C.D. Harvell et al., Climate warming and disease risks for terrestrial and marine biota (2002) Science 296 <https://people.ucsc.edu/~cwilmers/ENVS220/Harvell%20et%20al%202002%20Science.pdf> Accessed on 23 April 2018
[14] P.K. Thornton et al., The impacts of climate change on livestock and livestock systems in developing countries: A review of what we know and what we need to know (2009) ILRI <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308521X09000584> Accessed on 25 April 2018
[15] European Parliament, What if animal farming were not so bad for the environment (2017) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2017/598619/EPRS_ATA(2017)598619_EN.pdf> accessed on 05 May 2018
[16] Bob O’Sullivan and Charlotte Streck, Forestry and Agriculture under the UNFCCC: A Jigsaw Waiting to be Assembled? (The Oxford Handbook of International Climate Change Law, 2016)
[17] Sarah Sall, Ing-Marie Gren, Effects of an environmental tax on meat and dairy consumption in Sweden (2015) Food Policy 41
[18] Louise Edjabou, S. Smed, The effect of using consumption taxes on foods to promote climate friendly diets and the case of Denmark (2013) Food Policy 39, 84-96.
[19] Kelechi E Nnoaham et al, Modelling income group differences in the health and economic impacts of targeted food taxes and subsidies (2009) OJLS
Soils contain large quantities of carbon, mainly made up of decomposing plant materials and microbes. The Earth’s soils contain around 2500 Gt of carbon, four times more than vegetation.[1] Through soil degradation, much of natural soil carbon stocks has been lost. It has been estimated that the carbon sink capacity of the world’s agricultural and degraded soils is 50 to 60% of the historical carbon loss of 42 to 78 Gt of carbon.[2] With around 40% of the world’s surface being used for agriculture, it is suggested that these agricultural lands may be used as an important sink for atmospheric carbon.[3] Soil erosion control and soil restoration has an estimated carbon sequestration capacity of between 5 and 15% of global emissions.[4] After peaking, a new equilibrium will be reached and the sequestration potential goes down. It should also be noted that the carbon stored in soils can be easily emitted again with deep tillage and significant soil disturbance.[5]
Increasing soil carbon sequestration has a very interesting positive impact on climate change adaptation. Measures aimed at soil carbon sequestration increases the ability of soils to hold moisture and to better withstand wind and water erosion, enriches ecosystem biodiversity, helps cropping systems to better withstand droughts and floods, increases fertility for crops through restoring healthy soil microbial communities, and increases livestock efficiency (sustainable intensification).[6] Other potential positive side-effects of practices aimed at soil carbon sequestration are various environmental benefits, such as avoided use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides and improved biodiversity and wildlife.[7]
Examples of soil carbon sequestration practices relevant for Europe are the application of conventional or organic no-till and conservation tillage systems, the use of periodic green fallows, winter cover crops and crop rotations that utilize semi-perennial crops, rotational grazing, decreased grassland management intensity, perennial cropping, nutrient management consisting of compost (crop residue addition) and organic manure, and judicious use of irrigation water.
Research shows that strong top-down policies that are linked with, and fed by, bottom-up initiatives, are needed to achieve the required level of adaptation in the agricultural sector.[8] Holistic strategies have to be adopted that go beyond technical approaches aimed at stimulating autonomous farm-level risk reduction. So far, the EU did not focus much attention on agriculture in its climate change adaptation policy. The EU’s Adaptation Strategy refers to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in which adaptation measures have been integrated to a limited extent.[9] An assessment of the soil carbon related adaptation potential of the current CAP, however, shows that this potential is limited. Soil carbon projects can receive funding both under the green direct payments, and under the rural development policy. Whether such projects are actually carried out with CAP funding depends entirely on initiatives by farmers (for green direct payments), or by Member States (for the rural development policy). Unfortunately, there are not many indications that Member States radically focus their Rural Development Programmes (RDP) on climate change, perhaps with the exception of Ireland. The CAP also has several inherent constraints as far as soil carbon sequestration and associated adaptation are concerned, mostly due to the fact that CAP is not linked to the EU climate policy but serves as a separate instrument with a much wider policy goal than combatting climate change. The accounting rules, for example, do not require farm level quantification of the amount of carbon sequestered linked to the payment, so it cannot be assessed whether and in how far an increase in soil carbon levels is real, additional and verifiable. Integrating the CAP more into the EU’s climate policy requires rules to be set in place to assure a reliable measuring of the carbon sequestered. Payments, to give another example, are based on the amount of hectares per year of measures under the RDP, not on the amount of CO2 sequestered. This is a consequence of the provision that payments can only cover additional costs and income forgone resulting from the commitments made.[10] Such indirect payments, therefore, do not stimulate farmers to sequester as much carbon as possible. A third example of the CAP’s shortcomings with regard to soil carbon sequestration is that projects financed under the CAP are characterized by a relatively short lifespan, 1-5 years for green direct payments, and 5-7 years for projects under a RDP. Under a climate policy, such a lifespan is almost futile, as combatting climate change requires measures that cover decades, if not the entire 21st century. That is why in Australia, carbon sequestration projects are required to run for twenty five or even a hundred years (see blog posts on Australia’s carbon farming legislation part 1 and part 2).
Towards an alternative approach: agriculture in the EU ETS
The conclusion that the current EU policy is completely inadequate to stimulate large scale soil carbon sequestration on agricultural land seems inevitable, also when taking into account the broader climate change mitigation policy. The recently presented proposal for a European Regulation on the inclusion of greenhouse gas emissions and removals from land use and forestry into the EU’s 2030 climate framework (LULUCF Regulation) is a good first, yet inadequate, step towards including agriculture’s emissions and sequestration potential into the EU’s climate policy (see for broader assessment of the climate policy instruments, the paper). That is why an alternative approach needs to be developed. A further stimulus to the adoption of soil carbon projects that currently is not being discussed but that needs to be investigated at European level soon is the inclusion of agriculture in the EU ETS through allowing regulated industries to buy offsets from the agricultural sector, following the examples set by California, Alberta, Australia, and more recently also China.[11] These states show that it is possible to stimulate soil carbon sequestration (and other climate smart agriculture practices and technologies) through the ETS, provided an elaborate regulatory regime has been put in place to ensure integrity. When in place, sectors covered by the ETS will be allowed to finance sequestration projects on farm land, thus paying farmers for their efforts.
The recent report of the Agricultural Markets Task Force, a European Commission expert group, also proposes to incentivise to farm carbon in addition to crops. The Task force, however, proposes to do this through redirecting funds under the CAP after 2020. It is debatable, though, whether this will be a successful strategy given the inherent shortcomings mentioned above. Some of the current constraints can perhaps be repaired, such as the short commitment period, or the provision that payments can only cover additional costs and income forgone. It is highly unlikely, though, that the CAP budget will be big enough to cover an EU wide adoption of carbon farming practices. An evaluation of the Australian carbon farming legislation indicated that government funds will never suffice to roll out an incentive mechanism across all farms in the country and that private funds need to come in, either through a carbon tax or an ETS.[12] The latter seems very suitable for the EU with its well-developed ETS that, hopefully, will pick up speed again after the structural reform takes effect in the fourth trading phase, which runs from 2021 until 2030. Regulation aimed at establishing a finance flow from large industrial emitters to the farming sector, with its capacity to sequester large quantities of carbon on farm land, seems a promising alternative, which is completely in line with the polluter pays principle as laid down in Article 191(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU.
[1] Daniel Kane, Carbon Sequestration Potential on Agricultural Lands: a Review of current Science and Available Practices (Breakthrough Strategies & Solutions, Takoma Park, Md 2015).
[2] Emanuele Lugato et al., ‘Potential carbon sequestration of European arable soils estimated by modelling a comprehensive set of management practices’, (2015) 20 Global Change Biology 3557.
[3] Pete Smith, ‘Agricultural Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Potential Globally, in Europe and in the UK: What Have We Learnt in the last 20 Years?’ (2012) 18 Global Change Biology 35.
[4] M.G. Rivera-Ferre et al., Re-framing the Climate Change Debate in the Livestock Sector: Mitigation and Adaptation Options, (2016) 7 WIREs Climate Change 869.
[5] Ibid.
[6] P. Smith et al., ‘Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU)’ in: O. Edenhofer et al. (eds.), Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press 2015), 811, 846 and 847; J.R. Porter et al., ‘Food security and food production systems’ in: C.B. Field et al. (eds.), Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press 2015), 485, 515 and 518.
[7] Annette Freibauer et al., ‘Carbon Sequestration in the Agricultural Soils of Europe’ (2004) 122 Geoderma 1.
[8] L. Bizikova et al., Climate Change Adaptation Planning in Agriculture: Processes, Experiences and Lessons Learned from Early Adapters, (2014) 19 Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 411.
[9] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, An EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change, COM (2013) 0216 final, 8.
[10] Art. 28(6) Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013.
[11] Jonathan Verschuuren, Towards a Regulatory Design for Reducing Emissions from Agriculture: Lessons from Australia’s Carbon Farming Initiative, (2017) 7:1 Climate Law 1; Dong Sun et al., Carbon Markets in China: Development and Challenges, (2016) 52:6 Emerging Markets Finance and Trade 1361.
[12] Verschuuren 2017.
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This blog is a summary of a paper accepted for presentation at the 3rd European Climate Change Adaptation Conference ‘Our Climate Ready Future’, Glasgow, 5th-9th June 2017 (ECCA2017). My project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No 655565.
Agriculture depends on a stable climate. Crops need a fertile soil, sufficient water and temperatures that remain within a certain (plant specific) bandwidth, livestock needs healthy grazing land, sufficient water and livable temperatures. The climate needs to be predictable, so that farmers can plan their activities with the aim to secure the best possible harvest. Such stable conditions only occurred after the previous major climate change that took place on Earth and which marked the end of the last ice age, around 12,000 years ago. Around that time, man settled down and started to grow his own food through agriculture.
Given the dependence of agriculture on weather and climate, it does not come as a surprise that the agricultural sector is and will be hit hard by climate change impacts. The impacts are diverse and potentially disastrous for global food security. The latest IPCC report on the impacts on agriculture and food security gives a chilling image of what is expected to happen and, in fact, is already happening across the world.[1] Water shortages in droughts and heat waves have a negative impact on crops as well as livestock. A surplus of water with excessive precipitation, floods and inundation, increased and changing occurrence of pests, weeds and diseases, are but a few examples of the other impacts of climate change that negatively affect agriculture. Extreme weather events, generally, hit rural areas hard with a profound negative impact on rural communities and food production.
Against this background of increasing climate change impacts on agriculture, both through slow- and sudden-onset disasters, it is particularly worrying that food demand is and will continue to grow over the next few decades until 2050. It is expected that increasing climate change impacts on agriculture and rising demand will lead to an increase of food prices across the globe. According to the IPCC, ‘it is very likely that changes in temperature and precipitation (…) will lead to increased food prices by 2050, with estimated increases ranging from 3 to 84%.[2] A World Bank report adds that losses in the agricultural sector and spikes in food prices can push vulnerable consumers into poverty, as poor people spend a large part of their budget on food.[3] The 2008 food spike caused around 100 million people to fall into poverty, and the 2010–2011 food price spike has been estimated to have pushed 44 million people below the basic needs poverty line across 28 countries.[4] It can, therefore, be expected that there is a substantial risk of increasing famine in developing countries.
Developed countries, however, are not safe either. Consumers in developed countries are not only expected to face drastic price increases, but food safety issues as well.[5] Rural communities in developed countries are particularly vulnerable for climate change impacts, for several reasons, such as the substantially higher average age compared to urban areas. The IPCC refers to the social impact of the prolonged drought in Australia during the early 2000s which led to ‘farm closures, increased poverty, increased off-farm work, and, hence, involuntary separation of families, increased social isolation, rising stress and associated health impacts, including suicide (especially of male farmers), accelerated rural depopulation, and closure of key services’.[6]
Climate disaster law
Disaster law is the field of law that aims to respond to disasters, to compensate for the losses that occurred in a disaster and to facilitate recovery and rebuilding, as well as to mitigate the possible impact of future disasters. Climate disaster law is the rapidly developing new body of law which responds specifically to climate disasters. So far, however, attention for agriculture and food security has been fairly limited and it is clear that in this area, much needs to be done to prepare the world for increasing climate disasters hitting agriculture and food security.
Disaster mitigation in agriculture
The disaster mitigation phase, usually, is considered to be the most important phase of the disaster cycle (mitigation-response-rebuilding), not just because of the simple fact that prevention is better than curing, but also because of the nature of climate disasters. Adler rightfully observes that ‘drought and other disaster response policies that might be appropriate for occasional and difficult-to-foresee events may no longer be appropriate for conditions that will now occur with increasing frequency due to climate disruption’.[7]
Disaster mitigation for agriculture starts with the adoption of climate smart practices and technologies. Most countries, around the globe, do not have comprehensive and effective legal instruments in place that stimulate farmers to adopt climate smart practices and technologies.[8] To make the agricultural sector more resilient to climate change, it is essential that law and policymakers around the world rapidly start developing policies and laws so that climate-smart agricultural practices are commonplace soon. Financial instruments, such as subsidies or offset mechanisms under carbon pricing programmes can be used to achieve this goal. In addition, well-functioning early warning systems should be operational to help farmers to manage the hazards and avoid these turning into disasters. International collaboration and fundraising seems required to speed up the development and implementation of early warning systems for agricultural climate disasters. The same is true for climate and weather information and forecasts. These do exist, but have to be further developed to make the forecasts more useful for farmers.
Disaster response in agriculture
According to the FAO, between 2003 and 2013, about 3.4 percent of all humanitarian assistance was directed to the agriculture sector, with an average of around 374 million USD annually. The average annual crop and livestock production losses in developing countries, however, were much larger: an analysis of 140 disasters triggered by natural hazards found annual costs of crop and livestock losses to be 7 billion USD per year over the same period. With the expected increase of the number and size of disasters under climate change over the next few decades, much remains to be done to improve our ability to effectively respond to climate disasters, especially in the area of agriculture and food security. The current instrument of the Food Assistance Convention, that lays down a set of principles and best practices for effective and efficient food assistance for the most vulnerable people needs to be expanded to a full and comprehensive legal framework on international climate disaster response, so that the response efforts are well coordinated and aligned and so that domestic emergency managers are fully engaged and empowered.
Rebuilding: getting the farmer back into business asap
After a climate disaster, food production needs to be restored as soon as possible. Financial aid is usually needed so that farmers can clean up and prepare the land for agricultural activities, buy new seeds, new machines, new livestock etc. At the international level, organizations such as the World Bank, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, and the Special Climate Change Fund under the UNFCCC, put much effort into providing such financial aid. It is now well understood that farmers and communities should undertake investments with long term benefits, so that the next climate disaster has less impact. The compensation and rebuilding phase, therefore, is closely linked to the disaster mitigation phase.
A range of methods is explored for their suitability to compensate for the loss caused by climate change. Although private insurance has its limitations in the case of climate disasters, new insurance products are being developed, such as the ‘Broad Weather Insurance Policy’ which was developed by agricultural insurance companies together with agribusiness organisations and the government in the Netherlands to offer farmers insurance against climate change related crop damage.[9] This policy covers financial loss caused by natural disasters, such as extreme rainfall, extreme drought, erosion, severe windstorms, hailstorms and fires (caused by lightning). This insurance does not cover all damages, but instead requires farmers to bear 30% of the loss. The government has a subsidy scheme in place to provide financial assistance to individual farmers to pay for the premium. Reinsurance firms are even starting to operate in developing countries in Africa, where micro-insurance policies have been developed for farmers to cover for loss of crops due to drought, storms, pests, and diseases.[10] Private markets alone cannot provide the funding that is needed to develop and operate insurance products for farmers to protect them from financial losses caused by climate disasters. Some form of government intervention and cooperation between insurers, banks, governments and NGOs is essential to make climate disaster insurance for farmers a success. In order to avoid that farmers keep relying on government aid and insurance claims, and do not make the necessary changes to become more resilient to climate change, it is important that legal instruments in the area of disaster compensation reward the adaptive farmer.
[1] J.R. Porter et al., ‘Food Security and Food Production Systems’ in: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (CUP 2014), 485-533. The IPCC is currently preparing a special report on climate change, desertification, land degradation, sustainable land management, food security, and greenhouse gas fluxes in terrestrial ecosystems. This report is due to come out in 2019.
[2] Id. at 512.
[3] S. Hallegatte et al., Shock waves. Managing the impacts of climate change on poverty (Worldbank 2016) at 5.
[4] W.N. Adger et al., Human security in Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (CUP 2014) at 763.
[5] M. Miraglia et al., Climate Change and Food Safety: An Emerging Issue with Special Focus on Europe, (2009) 47(5) Food and Chemical Toxicology 1009–21.
[6] A. Reisinger et al., ‘Australasia’ in: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part B: Regional Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (CUP 2014) at 1398.
[7] Robert W. Adler, Balancing Compassion and Risk in Climate Adaptation: U.S. Water, Drought, and Agricultural Law, (2012) 64(1) Florida Law Review 201, 265.
[8] Jonathan Verschuuren, Towards a Regulatory Design for Reducing Emissions from Agriculture: Lessons from Australia’s Carbon Farming Initiative, (2017) 7(1) Climate Law at 6-10.
[9] W.J. Wouter Botzen, Managing Extreme Climate Change Risks through Insurance 57 (2012). For an up-to-date description of the cover of the current policy, see agricultural insurance company ‘AgriVer’ website, http://www.agriver.nl/gewassen-te-velde.html (in Dutch).
[10] The World Bank’s Global Index Insurance Facility, for example, stimulated the emergence of ACRE Africa (Agriculture and Climate Risk Enterprise Ltd.), operating in Kenya, Rwanda and Tanzania, see ACRE’s website http://acreafrica.com.
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Jonathan Verschuuren is professor of international and European environmental law at Tilburg University, the Netherlands. E-mail: j.m.verschuuren@tilburguniversity.edu. A detailed article on this topic will be published later this year in: Rosemary Lyster and Rob Verchick (eds), Climate Disaster Law: Barriers and Opportunities (Edward Elgar, 2017). This project received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No 655565.
Achieving the Paris Agreement’s climate goals will require states to start focusing both on reducing emissions from agriculture and on the sequestration potential of agriculture and land use. The imminent rise in global food demand coupled with the decline in fertile agricultural land caused by climate change will further necessitate the drafting and implementation of effective policies. These policies have to aim for mitigation, adaptation and food security, the three pillars of ‘climate smart agriculture’. Climate smart agriculture is an approach to developing the technical, policy and investment conditions to achieve sustainable agricultural development for food security under climate change (FAO 2013). Examples of climate smart practices are the introduction of rotational grazing management schemes, crop rotation, minimum tilling, permanent native vegetation on farmland and the use of compost and other soil additives to increase soil carbon levels. Examples of climate smart technologies are sophisticated, computerized drip-irrigation systems, and methane capture and conversion technologies in animal raising facilities. A comprehensive regulatory framework to incentivize the agricultural sector to convert from conventional practices to become climate smart is still largely lacking, not just in the EU, but worldwide. Incentives that already are applied on a small scale are subsidies and tradable offsets under a carbon pricing mechanism. It is expected that future policies aimed at advancing the implementation of climate smart practices and technologies in the farming sector will use one of these or both instruments.
Both are voluntary instruments in the sense that farmers can choose not to apply for a subsidy or participate in an offset scheme, yet both do have an impact on trade because these instruments incentivize certain agricultural practices thus favouring some domestic farmers and their products over foreign farmers and their (imported or exported) products. When drafting a policy aimed at stimulating climate smart agriculture, it is, therefore, important to remain within the legal boundaries set by international trade law. There has been remarkable little attention for these trade law limitations to domestic policies in the area of climate smart agriculture. In Australia, for example, there does not seem to have been any debate on possible WTO requirements for the domestic Australian carbon farming initiative, which is a scheme aimed at stimulating farmers to reduce emissions or increase sequestration through offsets that are bought up by the government in reversed auctions. Academic literature does exist, but mostly focuses on the WTO boundaries for domestic climate law in a broad sense. That literature is rather worrying. Because it takes a broad perspective and deals with all potential instruments that may infringe upon a wide range of WTO instruments, it looks as if the WTO is a huge stumbling block for domestic policies.[1]
In my view, it is more worthwhile to focus on the two most likely instruments. As stated above, policies aimed at stimulating climate smart agriculture are likely to be some sort of government subsidy of a system of offsets from agriculture that are allowed in the carbon market. These instruments primarily have to be assessed against the requirements of two WTO instruments: the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM).
Domestic policies aimed at stimulating the adoption of climate smart agricultural practices and technologies are environmental protection programmes that, in principle, are allowed under the so-called ‘Green Box’ of the AoA, provided the support is only given in the start-up phase and is terminated after the benefits from the conversion to climate smart practices, be it from improved productivity, the generation of energy or from the sale of carbon credits on the private carbon market, greatly surpass the costs involved. Incentives that have a positive impact on production, such as for soil carbon projects, and that are not allowed under the AoA’s Green Box, are actionable under the SCM Agreement. It is hard to say in general whether payments to farmers, be it through a subsidy or through the carbon market, are not actionable because they do not cause adverse effects on competing producers in other countries. This very much depends on the individual case.
Several carbon farming methodologies definitely have production-enhancing co-benefits and would, therefore be actionable under the SCM Agreement. Soil sequestration projects, for example, are known to have a tremendous positive impact on the production of crops. Financing such projects could, therefore, be seen as granting an actionable subsidy, as long as they are not covered by the AoA. This means that it is up to the injured WTO member state to prove these subsidies caused serious prejudice to its interests, i.e., that because of the subsidy, it suffers from displaced imports into the market of the subsidizing country, displaced exports to third countries, significant price suppression, or an increase in the world market share by the subsidizing country. Should a country succeed and subsequent consultations not lead to an agreement, the injured state can take countermeasures.
The accused state could argue that the subsidies are non-actionable because these are meant to promote adaptation of existing facilities to new environmental requirements imposed by law and/or regulations, as allowed under the SCM Agreement. It is, however, unlikely that all of the six conditions for this exception clause to apply are met as current schemes are voluntary, the subsidies are not one-time but re-occur every time new abatement has been achieved, and the payments are not limited to 20 per cent of the cost of adaptation. The condition that financial assistance should be directly linked to and proportionate to a firm’s pollution reduction, is only met in case of emissions abatement projects, such as methane capture. Sequestration projects are not covered as these do not reduce the firm’s own emissions. Whether the condition that the financial assistance needs to be available to all firms which can adopt the new equipment and/or production processes is met, depends on the design of the regulatory scheme. The Australian scheme, for example, under which only farmers with winning bids in a reversed auction receive government funds, seems incompatible with the latter condition.
The other WTO instruments are only relevant to a very limited extend. The GATT and TBT Agreement, generally, are not applicable in the case of the two instruments that are most likely to be used to stimulate climate smart agriculture. The GATS requires a policy to enable foreign service providers to be active under a carbon pricing mechanism aimed at offsets from agriculture. The TRIP Agreement requires states to protect the invention of climate smart technologies to be protected under patent law. Should policies be aimed at a rapid adoption of patented climate smart technologies, then states can opt for excluding a climate smart technology from patentability based on grounds of avoiding serious prejudice to the environment.
To further facilitate the adoption and implementation of policies promoting climate smart agriculture, the international community should take action in the area of international trade law. Unfortunately, climate change is not addressed in a comprehensive manner in the ongoing negotiations on liberalizing environmental goods and services, on the relationship between the WTO and the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement, and on agriculture, nor in the regular meetings of the Committee on Trade and the Environment and the TBT Committee. It is clear that policies aimed at stimulating climate smart agriculture cannot be neatly assessed under one of the current WTO Agreements, but instead are situated in between and across the various agreements, depending on the specific type of measure and the specific activity that is incentivized. It seems that it is difficult to give due consideration to climate smart agriculture in all of the ongoing negotiations and discussions within the WTO framework, although several realistic options to at least create more room do exist. The most realistic and feasible options in my view are including climate smart agriculture technologies in the yet to be concluded WTO Agreement on Environmental Goods and Services and to recognize carbon sequestration as an agricultural product under the AoA so that it becomes possible to support farmers’ sequestration measures under the Green Box.
[1] For example, David Blandford and Tim Josling, Greenhouse Gas Reduction Policies and Agriculture: Implications for Production Incentives and International Trade Disciplines (Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, 2009); David Blandford, “Climate Change Policies for Agriculture and WTO Agreements”, in Joseph A. McMahon, Melaku Geboye Desta (eds.), Research Handbook on the WTO Agriculture Agreement. New and Emerging Issues on International Agricultural Trade Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012), pp. 223 et sqq.; David Blandford, International Trade Disciplines and Policy Measures to Address Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation in Agriculture, E15 Expert Group on Agriculture, Trade and Food Security Challenges Think Piece (Geneva: ICTSD/WEF, 2013); Andrew Green, “Climate Change, Regulatory Policy and the WTO. How Constraining are Trade rules?”, 8:1 Journal of International Economic Law (2005), pp. 143 et sqq.; Christian Hberli, WTO Rules Can Prevent Climate Change Mitigation for Agriculture, Working Paper No. 2016/06 (London: Society of International Economic Law, 2016); Deok-Young Park (ed.), Legal Issues on Climate Change and International Trade Law (Cham: Springer International, 2016); Richard G. Tarasofsky, “Heating Up International Trade Law: Challenges and Opportunities Posed by Efforts to Combat Climate Change”, 2:1 Carbon and Climate Law Review (2008), pp. 7 et sqq.
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This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No 655565.
In my previous blog, I showed how various countries around the world are in the process of setting up offset schemes for agriculture, in an attempt to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from this sector. I also explained that Australia has a unique position as it has the longest operating system in place, and one that currently is not linked to emissions trading but is a stand-alone system. Technically, therefore, Australia’s Carbon Farming Initiative, is not an offset instrument, but a regulatory instrument aimed at achieving emissions reductions in the land use sector on its own. In this blog, I will focus on some of the results that have been achieved with the system so far, based on an empirical research that I carried out.[1] In case studies into selected CFI-projects and in a series of interviews with the key stakeholders, I searched for the experiences with the scheme in Australia, with the objective to draw lessons for other countries, including the EU as a whole, that wish to establish a policy aimed at reducing emissions from agriculture.
My research found that the current legislation on carbon farming in Australia provides an elaborate, yet reliable legal framework that seems well suited to assess project applications and issue credits to participating farmers who, through these projects, generated real and additional emission reductions. It was especially interesting to find that a major overhaul of the legislation in 2015, delinking the scheme from emissions trading, really pushed the scheme forward. Not having to sell credits on the volatile international carbon market, but being able to rely on long term, fixed government money (called ‘Emissions Reduction Fund’), spurred Australia’s farmers into action. It shows that it is important to create long term certainty for farmers. Farmers who want to introduce carbon farming have to implement structural changes to their farming practices with long term impacts on their business. The policy environment, as well as the agribusiness’ financial environment, has to accommodate such long term impacts. This also implies that relying on the carbon market for funding should only be done when there is long term certainty that carbon credits will earn an acceptable minimum price.
Another interesting finding is that, although Australia’s carbon farming policy and the associated regulatory framework is only aimed at achieving as much greenhouse gas abatement as possible against the lowest possible costs, many project actually have important co-benefits. These co-benefits often are an as important and sometimes even more important stimulus for farmers to convert to carbon farming than the direct financial benefits arising from selling generated carbon credits to the government. Generally, it is found that the policy is leading to the introduction of better farming methods in an overall conservative sector. These methods are not just good for combatting climate change, but have many benefits for farmers and even for food security. Vegetation projects generally reduce salination and erosion and improve water retention. Soil carbon projects were especially mentioned for having an astonishing impact on soil quality. Research indicates that an increase in the level of soil organic carbon, leads to a drastic increase of water availability and fertility, and thus to an increase in agricultural production. One respondent referred to an example he knew, of two brothers who had farmland adjacent to each other: ‘One of them was involved in a soil carbon project, the other was not. After a while, you could clearly see the difference, with much more and better growing crops on the land of the first. The other brother had to drive across his brother’s land to reach his own land and saw the difference every day.’ Although many respondents stressed that conservatism, especially among older farmers, slows down the adoption of these new climate smart practices, they all felt that the farming sector is slowly changing and is taking up these new practices. Assessing the impact of soil carbon projects, however, is complex and several stakeholders indicated that ‘we are still learning how to do it under different circumstances.’ Since the regulatory framework requires farmers to carefully monitor what is happening in the soil, a lot of new knowledge is generated. One respondent said: ‘We are in fact doing large scale experiments with soil carbon, all thanks to the Emissions Reduction Fund.’ There are many interesting case studies available remarkable results of reduced carbon emissions, better growing conditions, more water availability, and more biodiversity under such programmes as ‘soils for life’ and ‘healthy soils’.
Increasing soil carbon, therefore, has strong positive side-effects on adaptation as they increase the resilience of the land and lead to greater efficiency. Here, mitigation and adaptation go hand in hand. The same is true for some of the other sequestration methods that are allowed under the Australian scheme, such as native tree planting in arid and semi-arid areas both to store carbon and to stop degradation and salinization of farmland.
Sometimes, there are also direct economic co-benefits associated to carbon farming projects. In the piggeries sector, for example, there are producers who save A$ 15,000 (roughly € 10,000) per month on energy bills and earn an additional A$ 15,000 by delivering energy to the grid after having adopted methane capture and biogas production technology. When asked whether the CFI/ERF was the push factor, or the expected economic co-benefit, the respondent from the pork sector said that the CFI/ERF was the main driver for the distribution of this technology: ‘About half of the participating producers jumped because of the CFI/ERF push. It especially pushes medium sized producers, because it increases their payback just enough to get involved. Eighteen biogas projects in piggeries have to date generated A$ 6 million (€3.9m) a year in electricity savings and A$ 10.2 million (€ 6.6m) through carbon credits under the Emissions Reduction Fund. The Fund really was the driver for most of these eighteen producers.’ It is clear, though, that for the longer term, these co-benefits will continue to exist on a yearly basis, also without carbon credits being purchased by the government.
Grazing land regeneration project in western New South Wales (Photo: http://www.soilsforlife.org.au)
From these findings, the lesson can be drawn that a policy that has a wider focus on adaptation, food security, resilient and sustainable farm businesses and securing and creating jobs in the agribusiness sector, is likely to be more successful than one that only focuses on reducing emissions from agriculture. Several of the methods accepted or under development in Australia, such as those dealing with soil carbon, show that such co-benefits can indeed be achieved. Developing climate smart methodologies that not only deliver real, additional, measurable and verifiable emission reductions but also foster long term innovation and create economic, social and environmental co-benefits is essential for the success of any policy aimed at stimulating climate smart agriculture. Science has to be central in the development and adoption of methods that are accepted under the regulatory framework. In Australia, much research effort has already gone into method development. This now has to be taken to a global level. In order to avoid that every country is trying to invent the wheel, international collaboration in method development is pivotal. The aim has to be to roll out climate smart agriculture policies across the world, so as to stimulate our farmers to make a switch from conventional farming to climate smart farming.
[1] An article covering all the results of the project will be published in early 2017.
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This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No 655565.
Not many countries have regulatory schemes in place aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture. As indicated in the blog on the Paris Agreement and agriculture, the agricultural sector is responsible for almost 25% of anthropogenic GHG emissions, both through CO2 emissions caused by deforestation and peatland drainage, and through methane (NH4) emitted by livestock and rice cultivation, as well as through nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions caused by the use of synthetic fertilizers and the application of manure on soils and pasture. There is a dark cloud hanging over this because emissions are expected to rise over the coming years and decades because of an expected sharp rise in food demand. The Australian Climate Change Authority, in a 2014 climate change policy review for that country, for example, reports that the agricultural sector is expecting a doubling of demand for agrifood commodities in emerging economies in Asia, particularly China and India. It is expected that Australia is in a good position to meet this increased demand, as a consequence of which Australia’s production of agrifood is expected to increase by 77% in 2050 (from 2007 level). The Climate Change Authority in its report is pessimistic about what that means for climate change. Because of the strong economic incentives of the global food market, increasing emissions are inevitable: the expected production growth is likely to offset emission reductions achieved through the introduction of climate smart agriculture practices and technologies.
Doing nothing, however, is no option, as this will lead to an even bigger rise in emissions. And what is more: the agricultural sector has the potential to store large quantities of carbon in soils and vegetation. Domestic regulators, however, have been reluctant to address agricultural emissions, partly because of regulatory difficulties. It is, for example, difficult to measure emissions at the individual farm level since a variety of factors determine the amount of emissions (such as the diet of individual animals, soil composition, weather systems of individual regions, the way in which fertilizer is applied, etc.). In addition to emissions, removals are relevant as well since crops and other vegetation absorb CO2 from the air, and lots of carbon is stored in soils (more carbon is stored in soils than what is present in vegetation and the atmosphere). Soil carbon may be released, or remains there, or is increased, depending on how you manage the land.
A growing number of countries is setting up regulatory schemes aimed at reducing emissions from agriculture, mostly in the form of an offsets scheme linked to emissions trading. Under these schemes, industries and energy producers can buy credits generated by agriculture, and use these partly to comply with their obligation to hand in allowances equal to their emissions. This is the case in California, Quebec, Alberta, and Ontario. Under the California ETS, two types of agricultural offset projects are accepted, both aimed at reducing methane emissions: biogas systems in dairy cattle and swine farms, and rice cultivation projects. In Alberta, agricultural offsets include a wide range of projects: nitrous oxide emission reductions, biofuel production and usage, waste biomass projects, conservation cropping, several types of projects concerning beef production, projects aimed at reducing emissions from dairy cattle and biogas production.
The country with the longest experience in this area, however, is Australia. Despite the country’s much criticized poor overall climate policy, Australia adopted a Carbon Farming Initiative (CFI) as early as 2011, which spurred farmers into action and, therefore, potentially provides the rest of the world with a model to reduce emissions from agriculture. In 2011, the CFI originally was set up as an offset scheme under its ETS. Since the repeal of the ETS in 2015 (just before trading was set to start), the initiative, now called Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF) functions on its own and is enjoying rapidly increasing attention from farmers.
Instead of having to rely on the (unreliable) international carbon market, under the ERF farmers can offer the credits that they generated to the government through reversed auctions. Farmers can obtain credits for both emission avoidance projects and sequestration projects and offer these credits to the government. The government buys up credits from projects that achieved the biggest emissions cuts against the lowest costs. Agricultural emission avoidance projects mostly focus on methane emissions reductions: methane capture and combustion from livestock manure and methane emissions reduction through manipulation of digestive processes of livestock. A third important emission avoidance project for the agricultural sector is the application of urease or nitrification inhibitors aimed at reducing fertilizer and manure emissions. Sequestration projects are for example projects aimed at sequestering carbon in soils in grazing systems, on farm revegetation, rangeland or wetland restoration, the application of biochar to the soil, and the establishment of permanent plantings on farmland.
Since 2011, an enormous amount of expertise has been built up in Australia, and a very elaborate and effective regulatory system has been developed that on the one hand seems to ensure a high level of environmental integrity, while on the other hand not overburdening farmers with costly administrative obligations. The Australian scheme, therefore, is an interesting example for the rest of the world, particularly for the EU, that has yet to tackle emissions from agriculture. A government funded, project based system of emissions reductions seems to fit well in the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy.
In May 2016, the results from the latest auction were released. After three auctions a total of 309 carbon abatement contracts have been awarded by the Australian government to deliver more than 143 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent abatement, earning the project proponents a total of A$1.7 billion (about € 1 billion). The vast majority of abatement is by vegetation projects, which often are on farmland (but not always). Carbon farming has grown into an important new income stream for farmers in Australia. In a country prone to droughts, floods and bush fires, the scheme, therefore, not only helps to reduce emissions from agriculture, it also assists in diversification of agricultural practices and leads to a more resilient sector.
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This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No 655565.